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PREFACE
Since the first edition of this work was published in 1956 a number
of pertinent cases have been decided by the Tennessee courts.

This edition

includes these cases along with the original material still considered to
be relevant.
Amendment No. 6 applies to all counties and cities, except those
cities that elect to be covered by the optional home rule provisions of
Amendment No. 7.

Up to the present 13 cities have elected this option:

Chattanooga (1972), Clinton (1954), East Ridge (1954), Etowah (1964),
Johnson City (1955), Knoxville (1954), Lenoir City (1954), Memphis (1963),
Oak Ridge (1962), Red Bank (1956), Sev!erville (1954), Sweetwater (1955),
and Whitwell (1958).

Note that all except Memphis are in East Tennessee .

No city has held an election on repeal of home rule status, but the Chattanooga City Commission has approved the recommendation of a charter
study committee to submit the question of repeal to the voters at the
general election in November 1976 .

••

If municipal officials have questions or problems not resolved by

I,

the material herein, please call on MTAS for any additional assistance

•11
•
•
•
•

needed .
Victor C. Hobday
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The people of Tennessee, on November 3, 1953, approved eight consti-
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tutional amendments, the first changes in the document since its adoption
in 1870.

Two of these amendments, numbers 6 and 7, are especially signi-

ficant for the municipalities of Tennessee.

The sixth limits the power

of the State legislature to pass private or special legislation; the
seventh is the "optional home rule amendment."

The complete text of

No. 6 will be found on p. 10 and No. 7. on pp. 32-33.
These two amendments were generally referred to in the Convention as
the "Home Rule Amendments."

There was general agreement on the provisions

of Amendment No. 6 (approved by a vote of 85 to 5), but Amendment No. 7

II

was the most controversial issue in the Convention (approved by a vote of

II
II

it was the only issue mentioned by Chief Justice Neil, of the Tennessee
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•
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55 to 36).

The importance of the fonner was highlighted by the fact that

Supreme Court, in an address to the Convention. 1

The latter divided the

delegates and provoked a great deal of thought and debate. 2 Materials

ln1 doubt the propriety of my undertaking to give any advice to the
members of this body . • • • But I am frank to say that certain changes
should be made • • • • Over the years there has been too much unwise local
legislation in which the people affected by it were given little if any
voice whatever. Many of these private acts had no merit other than to
serve the basest ends in partisan politics." The Journal and Debates
of the Constitutional Convention (Knoxville: Bureau of Public Administration, The University of Tennessee, 1953), p. 392. Hereinafter
referred to as Debates •

~. Fletcher: " •• this question of home rule, I spent more study
on it than on all the other five subjects before us, combined." Debates,
PP• 949-950.
Mr. Hooper: "We are dealing with the biggest, broadest, most com1

·1
2
r

II

..
II

and suggested drafts for an amendment were furnished by the Tennessee Municipal League, and its representatives maintained close working relationships with members of the Convention.

Although its proposals were re-

vised, the League unquestionably was a major influence in the deliberations of the Convention, and it contributed substantially in achieving
acceptable compromises on very difficult issues.

..
II

In view of the interest of the League in this matter, the following
atatement was obtained from Herbert J, Bingham, the League's Executive
Secretary:

•
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3

City officials should proceed cautiously and only for
good cause in considering whether to become a home rule
municipality under Amendment No. 7. The pros and cons should
be carefully weighed in relation to each city's own circumstances.
The League supported Amendment No. 7 as a means of enabling those cities that need to do so to escape harrassment
by hostile political forces in control of local legislative
delegations. Even though subject to local veto under Amendment No. 6 1 such delegations can still pass private acts
that are narrowly partisan, punitive, and disruptive of
sound local government. And they can absolutely block amendments to a city's charter by refusing to introduce private
bills. In ra'~ instances emergency amendment of a charter

plicated question that has been before this Convention. • • • It affects
all the county governments and all the city governments, and you may say
that it is not only new, it is rather novel to Tennessee." Debates,
pp. 962-963 •
Mr. Hill: "I 8111 convinced that there is not a delegate on this floor
sufficiently advised of all the complex and far-reaching implications of
that most uncertain and illusive term 'home rule' to draft a broad and
comprehensive amendment on the aubject ••• the uncertain limits and
broad implications of which. no one has presumed to be able to describe
with any degree of certainty." Debates, p. 964.
.
Pres. Cooper: "I think the Committee on Home Rule has had more disaention and more disagreement than any committee of the Convention. • ,
They have had a far more complicated question, a question that involves
far 1ROre information • • • • " Debates, p. 974.
3See also an editorial in Tennessee Town & City (official magazine
of the Tennessee Municipal League), March 1954, Vol. V, no. 3, p. 19.
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may be needed before the next session of the General Assembly.
Under such circumstances a city may be well-advised to go
·
under Amendment No. 7. It may then amend its charter entirely
by local action, subject to the limitations stated in the
Amendment.

As I see it the principal disadvantage of electing to
be covered by Amendment No. 7 is the inability of a city to
secure amendments to its charter through private acts, especially with respect to taxing powers. Taxes on hotel accommodations in Gatlinburg, on cigarettes and liquor in
Memphis, and on amusement admissions in Knoxville, are a
few examples of auch private acts. New taxing power• can
be acquired very easily by private acts through a cooperative legislative delegation, but may be extremely difficult
to obtain through general acts. Although this League, through
the statewide cooperation of municipal officials, has been
able to win from the General Assembly virtually every necessary authority for municipal governments, its two most notable
failures came in efforts to expand the taxing power of ml111icipalities.
The small city may find that going under Amendment No. 7
is the only way to obtain needed charter changes. The typical small town has less than one per cent of .the total vote
cast for its State Senator, and few cities have over 10 per
cent. The voters in these towns and cities are thus completely helpless at the polls and cannot, with their few
votes, insure election of legislators with a sound platform
for their city or defeat those hostile to their city government. Some senators have as many as 15 towns and 6 counties
in their district and can veto (by refusing to enact) a
change in any or all of these local governments, however
much it may be locally supported.
Short of adoption, Amendment No. 7 may be useful in
securing prompt and fair consideration of municipal charter
requirements from a local legislative delegation on the
basis: if the local charter changes required are not
enacted, a community can protect its interests through the
adoption of optional home rule and charter change locally;
faced with the possibility of thus losing control over a
aunicipality, a legislative delegation might become more
cooperative •
Any city ahould give this matter careful consideration
before electing to go under Amendment No. 7. One good feature is that a decision is not irrevocable, as reverse action
aay be ·taken if experience under this Amendment is unsatisfactory--home rule status aay be terminated by a majority
vote in an election for this purpose •
Constitutional and statutory provisions quite often require judicial

..
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rule has failed, failure has resulted primarily from the attitude of the
4
state courts."
The Tennessee cases up to this time seem to indicate. solid

construction.
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As stated by one authority, "in those states where home

judicial support for the objectives and concepts of the constitutional convention .

4
Wallace Mendelson, "Paths to Constitutional Home Rule for Municipalities," 6 Vanderbilt Law Review 66, December 1952. Dr. Mendelson participated in the convention's drafting work, as a consultant to the Tennessee
Municipal League •

'-1

5

II•

II
11-

CHAPTER II
FUNCTIONAL ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
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Amendment No. 6
This amendment applies to all municipalities except those that have
voted to go under Amendment No. 7.

degree of home rule that No. 6 affords is adequate before electing to be
covered by No. 7.
Under Amendment No. 6 no private act may be passed "having the effect
of removing the incumbent from any municipal or county off ice or abridging
the term or altering the salary prior to the end of the term for which
such public officer was selected."
Any other private act must contain a provision that it will not become effective unless approved by two-thirds of the legislative body or
by a majority of those voting in an election, in the city or county
affected.

Numerous acts have been noted which circumvent this require-

ment through the device of a narrow population or other classification
that includes only one city; if challenged in court most of these acts

111~

probably would be invalidated.

II!

Advantages

•
•..
..
..

A city should consider whether the

1.

Interference with the term or salary of any municipal officer by

private act is prohibited.
2.

Ne~ded

No such private act can be passed.

charter amendments can be obtained by private act very

•imply through cooperative senator(s) and representative(&) in the General
Assembly.
3.

Taxing powers may be conferred on a city by private act.

Little

difficulty is usually encountered on such an act sponsored by a local leg-

•II
•II
•II
•II
II

•II

6

islative delegation, as contrasted with general tax laws that often provok'
statewide opposition in the Legislature.

Cities under

Amendme~t

No. 7

•ust rely on general tax laws.

'

'

4.

The general public uy be uninformed or apathetic on charte"r

changes that are complicated and technical.

•.

i;

In such cases more reasona-

ble, intelligent action might be taken by a 81Dall group (legislative delegation and city legislative body) who can and will devote more time and
study to such utters, as compared with the election procedure under Amend-

•

ment No. 7 •
Disadvantages
1.

Private acts may be passed which affect the tenure or salaries of

employees (as distinguished from officers); however, any such act would
not be effective until given local approval as provided in the act, by one
of the two methods prescribed in this amendment •
2.

No charter amendment can be obtained if the local legislative del-

egation refuses to sponsor it.

Cooperative relationships between a city

administration and a legislative delegation will be necessary if legislation needed by the city is to be passed.
),

A legislative delegation could pass private acts which may create

serious problems for a city.

Poor legislation could result from an atti-

tude that "the final decision ia to be 11111de by the city--let them worry
about it."

Multiple elections also could be required by the terms of pri-

vate acts, which might create undue public controversy having unnecessarily
devisive effects on a community.
4.

The General Assembly could determine the salaries of municipal

officers and employees by general acts, and any private acts inconsistent

..
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therewith probably would be invalidated.
5.

The possibility exists, though remote,.that private bills spon-

'

eored by a cooperative legislative delegation would not be passed by the
-(

!

General Assembly or would be vetoed by the Governor.

I

!

6.

Effecting charter changes through private acts will be viewed by

some people as less democratic than the election method under Amendment
No. 7 if the method of approval is by the legislative body.
7.

The prohibition against removal from office or abridging the

term of an officer, if literally applied, could block bona fide desirable
reorganizations (such as changing the form of government).
Amendment No. 7
If this amendment is to apply a city must take the initiative by ordinance to call for an election on the question, "Shall this municipality
adopt home rule?"

If a city's charter provides for initiating ordinances,

such an election could probably be called for by the petition procedure if
the city legislative body does not act.
After a city has elected to go under Amendment No. 7, and until it
elects to abandon home rule by an election, no private act of any kind
may be passed for that city.

The amendment requires the General Assembly

to act with respect to the city "only by laws which are general in terms
···~.::_-..,_.,_ ... ..
. --- and effect." The ~ossibility also exists, as under Amendment No. 6, of

.....

the so-called general act applicable by a narrow population classification
to only one city which is in fact a private act, but it would seem to be
1mlikely that such an act would be sustained by the courts •.
Advantages
1.

No private acts of any kind may be passed.

Therefore, a private

I

... 1

I
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act affecting the tenure or salary of an employee, as well as that of an
officer, is prohibited.
2.

The city may amend its own charter, by popular vote, and is not

dependent on the local legislative delegation in the General Assembly.
The city legislative body can initiate changes by ordinance.
3.

The General Assembly could fix the salaries of municipal officers

and employees by general acts, but such general acts would apply in home
rule cities only to the extent that they are not inconsistent with charter
provisions .
4.

Charter changes can be accomplished without requiring approval by

the General Assembly and the Governor.
5.

It can be said that charter changes are truly democratic, because

they must be approved in elections open to all voters in a home rule municipality.
6.

Reorganization of a municipal government could be accomplished by

locally-approved charter changes, free of possible restrictions in Amendment No. 6 on removing incumbents or abridging terms of officers.
Disadvantages
1.

The city loses the relatively simple procedure of securing desired

charter changes through private acts.
2.

,.

Amendment of the charter is fairly cumbersome, especially if a

charter commission is elected instead of proposal by ordinance.
3.

A city's taxing powers may not be enlarged by private acts.

For

example, had Memphis been a home rule municipality the 1955 private act
empowering that city to levy a 3 per cent tax on liquor and a cigarette
tax of 1¢ per package could not have been enacted.

~

~
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~

•
'•
•
•
'•
•
•
•
•
•
7

•

9

4.

Public interest is notably apathetic in referendum elections on

details of governmental operations.

Frequent referendums and low voting

petcentages can permit special interest groups to dominate such elections.

-i

I

I

..

10

II
II
II
II
II
II

CHAPTER III
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF AMENDMENT NO· 6

i

,l

The full text of this amendment is reproduced below.

On the folloW-

ing pages its provisions are analyzed in detail, in the order in which
they appear in the amendment.
Be it resolved, That Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee be amended by adding at
the end of said Section as it now reads, the following:

II
II
II

•
•
•
•
•
•
••
'
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The General Assembly shall have no power to pass a
special, local or private act having the effect of removing
the incumbent from any municipal or county off ice or abridging the term or altering the salary prior to the end of the
term for which such public officer was selected, and any act
of the General Assembly private or local in form or effect
applicable to a particular county or municipality either in
its governmental or its proprietary capacity shall be void
and of no effect unless the act by its terms either requires
the approval by a two-thirds vote of the local legislative
body of the municipality or county, or requires approval in
an election by a majority of those voting in said election
in the municipality or county affected.

***
What is a municipality?
This amendment applies to "any municipal or county office" and to a
"municipality or county." No questions· should arise as to the meaning of
"county office" and "county," but the words "municipal office" and "municipality" may be subject to interpretation.

It may be aaaumed that a "munic-

ipal office" would exist only in a "municipality,"

10

attention will be

directed to the latter •
"A municipal corporation" has been defined as "a body corporate
chiefly to regulate the local or internal affairs of the city, town, or

..
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· district incorporated. 115

In a case arising under the Utility District

Act of 1937, the court aaid:

"It is elementary that the Legislature may

call such bodies what it pleases.

..

vision for the creation and operation

Here it has chosen to make pro•• of a somewhat new and quite

limited in scope corporate instrumentality. 116

The City of Memphis is an

example of how terminology can vary; as a municipal corporation it was
abolished in 1879, but the next act of the same legislative session recreated it as a "taxing district."

Subsequently it was re-deoignated as the

"City of Memphis," and the usual powers of a municipality were granted by
numerous private acts •
Cases in other states have held the following to be "municipalities"
or "municipal corporations":

sewer district, school board or district,

housing authority, and utility district.
not to be in this category:

The following have been held

drainage district, improvement district, ir-

rigation district, school district, board of water commissioners, and
board of park commissioners •
Two Tennessee cases indicate that the word "municipality" is likely
to be construed to mean only incorporated cities and towns.

In Fountain

City Sanitary District v. Knox County Election Commission, 203 Tenn. 26,
308 S.W.2d 482 (1957), the court held that this amendment did not apply to
that district, even though the creating private act called it "a municipality or public corporation in perpetuity" (the general law under which
most utility districts are organized also declares that any "district so

5state v. Knoxville, 115 Tenn. 175, 90 S.W. 289 (1905) •
6

First Suburban Water Utility District v. McCanless, Com'r., 177 Tenn.
128, 146 S.W.2d 948 (1941) •
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incorporated shall l>e a 'municipality' or public corporation in perpetuity").
The court's opinion noted that the lead line of Article XI, Section 9, as

.reproduced
.

in the Tennessee Code Annotated, includes "Home Rule for cities

and counties," and that "unless there is to be ignored the word 'cities'
in the lead line--and the court has no right to ignore it--the word 'municipality' used continuously in the body of the Act 'allst be construed as
meaning a municipality within the general understanding of what is a 'city.'"
Justice Swepston, in a concurring opinion, noted that in the Journal of the
Constitutional Convention, from pages 1038 through 1059, "the word 'cities'

:

and the word 'counties' are used throughout the discussion and the word
'municipality' appears only two or three times.

,

There is not the slightest

indication that there was any thought in the minds of the different speakers of any type of municipality other than a 'city' of one or the other
class."

One Justice dissented, expressing an opinion that the sanitary

district should be regarded as a municipality within the meaning of the
amendment.
In Perritt v. Carter, 204 Tenn. 611, 325 S.W,2d 233 (1959), the
amendment was held inapplicable to a special school district, the court
observing that although it was a public corporation "yet i t was not a
municipal corporation in the sense that it can be authorized to impose
taxes."

***
The General Assembly shall have
no power to pass a special, local
or private act having the effect
of removing the incumbent from any

•
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municipal or county off ice or sbridging the term or altering the salary
prior to the end of the term for

.es

II
II
II:· ...
s

the

'Ill!·

which such public officer was selected,
Denial of power
The Tennessee Supreme Court, in the case of Shelby County v. Hale,
200 Tenn. 503, 292 S.W.2d 745 (1956), emphasized that the key words of
this amendment are "shall have no power," and that this prohibition extends to "legislation which has the e'ffect of (1) removing an incumbent
from a county or municipal office, (2) abridging the term of such officer

!St

Ill
Ill
Ill

llJ

or (3) altering the salary of such office during the term thereof."

struck down an act increasing the salaries of Shelby County commissioners
during their terms which had been 'Unanimously approved by the Quarterly
County Court and had been sustained by two chancellors sitting in bane,
commenting that "if we were to adopt this construction [that approval by
the county court saved the act] ••• by learned and able Chancellors,
we would in effect be wholly eliminating the words 'the General Assembly

Ill

shall have no power ••• ' from the section."

Ill
I
I

Who is a "public officer"?

IJ
IJ
IJ_,_

It

The above provision applies to "any municipal or county office" and
to "such public officer," meaning a person filling "any municipal or
county office."

In Ross v. Fleming, 211 Tenn. 255, 364 S. W. 2d 892 (1963),

holding that a county attorney is an officer under this amendment, the
court quoted the following from Glass v. Sloan, 198 Tenn. 558, 281 S.W.2d
397 (1955):

"j

II
II ·j
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In deciding whether a particular employment is an off ice within the meaning of the Constitution or statutory
provisions, it. is necessary that each case be determined
·by a consideration of the particular facts and circumstances
involved; the intention and subject matter of the enactment,
the nature of the duties, the method by which they are to
be executed, the end to be attained, etc.

'

•

The line between the public office and the public employment is sometimes not too clearly marked by judicial
decisions. One of the criteria of public office is the
right of the officer to claim the emolument of eaid office
attached to it by law. Another one of the criteria of public off ice is the oath required by law of the public of ficials, ••• another the bond required by law of certain
public officials. But in determining the question of whether
or not this Act under consideration creates an office or
employment it is not necessary that all criteria be present,
however, it has been held on good authority that tenure,
oath, bond, official designation, compensation and dignity
of position may be considered along with many other things.
Questions may arise as to which persons in a municipal government are
"public officers."

The Tennessee courts have said that a mayor, a judge,

a city physician, 7 a city manager, 8 a paymaster, 9 and a marshal or constable10 are officers.

At one time policemen were held to be "officers, "11

but a later decision held that a "policeman is not an officer," and "cer12
tainly it cannot be said that a fireman is an officer."
However, a chief
of police is an officer. 13

7Wise v. Knoxville, 194 Tenn. 90, 250 S.W.2d 29 (1952).
8state v. Thompson, 193 Tenn. 395, 246 S.W.2d 59 (1952).
9aenniger v. Memphis, 120 Tenn. 555, 111 S.W. 1115 (1908).
lOPesterfield v. Vickers, 43 Tenn. 205 (1866).
11
Porterfield v. State, 92 Tenn. 2R9, 21 S.W. 519 (1893); Cornet v.
Chattanooga, 165 Tenn. 563, 56 S.W.2d 742 (1933).
12wise v Knoxville, supra.
13Broyles v. State, 207 Tenn. 571, 341 S.W.2d 724 (1960).

..
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From the foregoing it is apparent that it would be very difficult to
devise a definition that would answer this question as applied to all positidns.

Probably most individuals working for a municipal gove-rrunent would

II

be classified as "employees."

1111

officer ••• do not hold public offices, but their functions are rather

..
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II
II
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"Employees and •ubordinatea having no duties

to perform other than those directed by the head of the department or chief

in the nature of contracu of employaent."14

May private legislation alter salaries of employees?
A COllllllOn practice, in the years before this amendment, was the enactment of private legislation to increase the salaries of certain personnel,
•uch as teachers, policemen and firemen, in a particular city.

Would the

language of this amendment prohibit such legislation?
The answer to this question would appear to be negative for personnel
classified by the courts as "employees," as contrasted to "officers,"
within the meaning of this amendment.

Kost municipal employees do not

serve definite "terms" but are employed under civil service regulations or
serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority, and therefore the provision "altering the salary prior to the end of the term" would appear to
be inapplicable.

Any such act would, of course, be ineffective unless

locally approved as the amendment requires.
The word "selected" encompasses popular election, appointment (or
election) by a municipality'• governing body, and appointment by a mayor
or other official,

Cases construing the meaning of "select" aake it

14McQuillin Mun. Corp. (3rd. ed.), sec. 12.30, citing Cornet v.
Chattanooga, supra.

•
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16
equivalent to "elect" and appoint. 1115

It was indicated in the convention

that this was the intended meaning. 16

:J

Effect on reorganization or change in form of government
Certain changes in the form or structure of a municipal government,
which might otherwise be accomplished by a private act charter amendment,
might be blocked by the prohibition against "removing the incumbent" or
"abridging the term" of an officer "prior to the end of the term for which
such public officer was selected."

For example, would this provision pre-

vent a change from commission to mayor-council government, prior to expiretion

of the commissioners' terms?
This would be an especially difficult problem where the commissioners,

or other officers, serve for overlapping terms.

Could a waterworks board

be abolished and its functions be transferred to a board responsible for
all municipally-owned utilities?

If auch a board is composed of five

members serving overlapping five-year terms, would the effective date have
to be postponed to the termination of the longest terms remaining to be
served, and if so what would be the terms of other members during this time?
Would the freedom of choice formerly enjoyed by voters of a city, to
change their form of government, be cancelled by the impossibility of doing
so without affecting some officer's term of office?

It is entirely possi-

ble that a literal, rigid application of this provision would have such an
effect.

Dicta in Shelby County v.

!!.!1!.•

200 Tenn. 503, 292 S.W.2d 745 (1956),

15xresser v. Fitzsimmons, 68 N.Y. 514 (1878); Bareham v. Rochester,
128 Hise. 642, 220 N.Y.S. 66 (1927); Jackson v. Coxe, 208 La. 715, 23 So.
2d 312 (1945).
16oebates, pp. 926, 1122.
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indicstes that this provision might be so literally applied.
Consideration might be given to the possibility that the courts could
consider "abridge the term" and "abolish the office" as two different ac-·
tions, although the latter would have the effect of abridging the term.
McQuillin says that a "valid removal may result from the abolition of an
office, place or position. • • •

The abolition of an office .has been said

not to constitute a 'removal' of the incumbent. 1117
however,

Against this view,

is an opinion by the Tennessee Supreme Court sustaining a chan-

cellor's holding that a_private act violated Article XI, section 9, because it "abolishes the office of justices of the peace for those districts
created by said 1953 Act and as a matter of law has the effect of removing said officers from office."

18

It may be noteworthy that two early drafts in the Convention (Resolutions 29 and 59, the former by Mr. Pope, the chief architect of Amendment No. 6) limited the power to abolish only if another similar office
were created by the same session or if the voters petitioned for a referendum.

It may also be significant that later drafts dropped any ref er-

ences to "abolish" or "abolition"; perhaps this was considered superfluous,
assuming that such action would be within the meaning of "having· the effeet."

Many drafts were introduced, and only one after Resolutions 29 and

59 contained any reference to abolition of an office--this was proposed
by Mr. Miller and Mr. Tipps and included the clause "which abolishes or
creates an office."

l7McQuillin Mun. Corp. (3rd ed.), sec. 12.246.
18Byrd v. Rhea County, 207 Tenn. 62, 338 S.W.2d 545 (1960),

I

I_

I

...
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Comments by two delegates in the convention, however, indicated that
they viewed this language as a prohibition, under any circumstances, against
;

a~olition

-:

.

~

of an office before the end of the incumbent'& term:

Mr. Dodson: And in these boards and commissions, as
a general rule, the terms of the selected officers of those
boards and commissions are staggered so that one will expire
say in 1953, and another one in 1954, and another one in
1955, 1956, and 1957, and so on. Now, Sir, would the effect
of this first paragraph be to freeze those men on those commissions and boards for the length of the longest term of
the man on the board, or not?

i

II.
II

Mr. Fletcher:
Mr. Dodson:

In my opinion, it would.
It would?

Mr. Fletcher: Yea, that is the difficulty. It is one
that we saw no way to get around; I can only say this, that
the general result of this provision will result in 10 much
benefit that occasional difficulties, and there would be
occasional difficulties in some particular city or county,
would have to be borne. That is the only answer I can give,
Mr. Dodson:
, • no city that adopted optional home
rule could obviate that difficulty by making the adoption;
is that right?
Mr. Fletcher:

That would be my opinion. 19

Mr. Pope [explaining Amendment No. 6]: , •• that
resolution simply means this, that the legislature cannot
under any circumstances pass an act abolishing an office,
changing the term of the office or altering the salary of
the officer pending the term for which he was selected;
that is prohib ted, and that kind of an act cannot be
passed. • • , 2

0

Viewed against the background of the private act 1ystem as it existed
prior to 1953, described by former Chief Justice Neil of the Tennessee
Supreme Court as "too much unwise local legislation in which the people
affected by i t were given little if any voice whatever • • • • these pri'·.!te

l9Debates, p. 1039.
20Debates, p. 1113 •

..

..
II

19
acts had no merit other than to serve the basest ends in partisan politics, u2l it seems possible that the courts could make a distinction between such acts and those effecting a bona fide reorganization of a
municipal government, especially if the form of local approval is by popular referendum.

The so-called "ripper bills" that the constitutional

convention sought to outlaw had been bills enacted by the General Assembly

•II
Ill

•
•II
•I
•
•
•
•I

with no local approval whatsoever, and generally such bills had been
22
aimed at particular individuals.
Effect on charter recall provisions
The question of whether this amendment outlaws charter recall proviaions was answered in the negative by the Tennessee Court of Appeals, the
court observing that the incumbent commissioner "has not been removed from
office by said recall petition [but] has merely been aubjected to the
hazard of a new election, the risk of which he assumed when he accepted
office under the provisions of the Charter of Union City. • • • " 23
A possible means of circumventing this provision
It should be noted that this prohibition is against passage of a
"special, local or private act."

This would not prevent the classification

of municipalities according to population and the enactment of general

21Debates, p. 392 •
22see Catherine Fox Siffin, Shadow over the City (The University of
Tennessee Record, Extension Series, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, June 1951). The
research was a project of U.T.'s Bureau of Public Administration.
23

Roberts v. Brown, 43 Tenn. App, 567, 310 S.W.2d 197 (1957) •

~

20
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legislation applying only to a particular class. 24

II:

II,.
'
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However, there must be

a reasonable basis for the classification.
'.

In Frazer v. Carr, 210 Tenn. 565, 360 S.W.2d 449 (1962), the court·

sustained the enabling act under which the Nashville-Davidson County Metro
charter had been adopted, holding that the provision making it applicable
only in counties with more than 200,000 population was valid "because we
all know that it is in these large counties that the problem of the large
cities as to the ever increasing population just beyond the corporate limits becomes more acute, complex and confusing."

In the 1ame case an amend-

ment of 1961 to the Metro act which authorized establi1hment of a charter
commission by private act, and a 1ubsequent private act creating auch a
commission for Nashville and Davidson County, were sustained on grounds
that the 1961 amendment was "applicable to every county which falls within
an admittedly reasonable classification."

The test is whether the class

is reasonable, not that only one city or one county is affected.
An act amending TCA 6-202 applicable only to a "city having a metropolitan form of government" was attacked on grounds that it was a private
act in effect because only Nashville had that form of government; in rejecting this challenge the court said, "it is quite apparent that this Act
applies throughc ,~
25
purview."

the State to all those who desire to come within its

The so-called "general" act, applying to a very narrow population
bracket including only one city, is a familiar disguise for a private act,

24

Luehrman v. Taxing District, 70 Tenn. 425 (1879);
Tenn. 407, 16 S.W. 471, 13 L. R. A. 183 (1891).

~

v. State, 90

25 Doyle v. Metro. Government, 225 Tenn. 496, 471 S.W.2d 371 (1971).

..
' 21
and has been sustained by the courts in the past (such acts have been published in the volumes labeled "Private Acts").

The Tennefsee Supreme Court,

id upholding a "general" act that by a population claasification applied
only to Montgomery County, said:
However far fetched might seem the rule, and however
vicious may be considered the practice which produces laws
through legislative courtesy by force of the will of the
representatives for a single county, the doctrine that
classification by reference to the Federal census if otherwise unobjectionable is permissible cannot be repudiated
after long adherence of its application in adjudicated cases
sustaining certain Statutes upon particular subjects. It
could not be repudiated without producing more or less
confusion in every county of the State. Personal and property rights would be measurably a~fected and the resultant·
confusion would be injurious to t'he State. The doctrine
of stare decisis commands adherence to the rule.
,26
In State v. Turnpike Co, 133 Tenn. 446, 181 S.W. 682 (1915), the
court described as undesirable a situation that has become the pattern
for most Tennessee cities (excluding those organized under general law
charters):

'
'•
'I
•
•
•I
!

"If classification by population were deemed permissible of

adoption for every purpose, each county and municipality may for its govertllllent be provided with a distinct code of laws, general in mere form,
but specific or local in substance and fact."
This point is discussed in greater detail in the following analysis
of Amendment No. 7 (see pp. 38-41; note also Lawler v. Mccanless, briefed
on pp. 23-24).
Salary changes
Past decisions have indicated that changes in salaries of officers
could be effected only at the beginning of the next terms of office.

)

26iJ111iams v. State, 155 Tenn. 364, 293

s.w.

757 (1927) •

In

•
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•
•
•
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•

~
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Shelby County v. Hale, 200 Tenn. 503, 292 S.W.2d 745 (1956), the court held
that a county officer's salary could not be changed during his term of office, even though the private act had been approved by the local governing
body; the defense had argued that the latter part of Amendment No. 6 was
an exception to the former part, but the Supreme Court held otherwise •
However, this doctrine may be partially modified by recent legislation (not
yet tested in court) providing for escalator increases for judges and other
officials based on cost of living indices.
A question that may arise is whether the legislation must be enacted
before an election is held, rather than after an individual has been elected
to an office but before his term begins.

In the latter case, technically

the salary change would not take place during his term of office but it
would obviously be for the benefit of a person already elected.
Another approach to this problem would be the omission of salaries
from private act charters altogether and the delegation of this authority
to a municipality's governing body, coupled with a like restriction that
no salary changes may be made during an officer's term of office.

This

would place the determination of salaries in the hands of the locally
elected representatives of the citizens-of a municipality.

Some advantages

that might be claimed for this approach would be greater flexibility, increased responsiveness to local public opinion, and more consistency with
the-principle of home rule.

Furthermore, the General Assembly would be

freed from the necessity of having to make numerous policy decisions as to
salaries for a large number of municipal offices.

Such an arrangement,

however, would be subject to criticism that members of the governing body
re-elected for new terms would have participated in setting their own
salaries.

..

23
R
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and any act of the General Assembly private

..,f-

or local in form or effect applicable to a

..

91.ng

particular countv or municipality either in
its governmental or its proprietary capacity
shall be void and of no effect unless the

llnot

act by its terms either requires the approval
"er
by a two-thirds vote of the local legislative
body of the municipality or county, or re-

II

quires approval in an election by a majority

ected
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of those voting in said election in the municipality or county affected.
Application
The effect of this provision is to give each county and municipality
a veto power (either by action of its governing body or by a referendum)
over any private legislation affecting it.

It applies to

!1l

private

acts, including any of the type mentioned in the foregoing discussion.
For example, an act raising employees' salaries could become effective
only upon local approval by one of the two methods provided.
"in form or effect"
These are the crucial words of this clause (with probably the same
•aning as "in terms and effect" used in Amendment No. 7, discussed in
folloving pages).

In passing on an act that purported to make the General

Sessions Court of Gibson County a State court by enlarging its jurisdiction and paying a portion of the salary from the State treasury, the
court observed that it was an "amendatory Act applied, by population

..
..
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classification, to Gibson County alone" (without any provision for local

i

t'

approval), and that because it was "local in effect" it "violates Article

,;

XI, Section 9, of the Constitution of our State and is void. 11 27

4

11

Delegate authority to city governing body
A city planning to continue to operate under a private act charter
aay be well advised to secure, whenever possible through friendly legialative delegations, the adoption of charter amendments phrased in general
terms.

If the powers are expressed in broad and general terms, if the

determination of what offices are to be established and their aalariea,
functions, and the like are left to the governing body of the city, and
if, in general, a lllinimum of restrictions are imposed and aaximum authority is delegated to the city council, then the occasions for legislative
enactments ahould be very much reduced.

Once a city is in this po1ition,

it may re1ist future intrusions by unfriendly legislative delegations
through the power of the legislative body or voters to disapprove private
acts.
Alternative methods for local approval
This provision makes any private act for a particular city "void and
of no effect" unless i t requires approval (1) by "a two-thirds vote of the
local legislative body" or (2) "in an election by a majority of those voting in aaid election."

The method of approval must be apecified in "the

act by its terms," thus placing this responsibility in the General Asaembly which, under the practice of "courtesy" followed so consistently, act-

27tawler v. Mccanless, 220 Tenn. 342, 417 S.W.2d 548 (1967).
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ually places it in the hands of the local legislative delegation.

A county

or city may request one or the other method, but it is solely within the
discretion of the General Assembly (local legislative delegation) to
decide.
In a few counties, as in Knox County, there has been some controversy
as to the respective powers of a county commission established by private
act and the quarterly county court.

The convention debates indicate a

clear intention that this authority would be vested in the quarterly county
court; a proposal to change the term "local legislative body" to "local
governing body" was voted down, and on this point Mr. Pope had this to say:
• • • we changed that word advisedly and carefully • • •
there is a real controversy in those counties like Hamilton,
as to what is the governing body of that county; and the
Supreme Court decision has been many times or several times
that we know of, that the Quarterly County Court composes
and makes up the legislative body for that county • • • •
. there would be a controversy in certain counties where they
have both of these bodies, and there would be a question
as to what was the governing body; and we think that clearly
the word "legislative" ought to be written in it.28
What is meaning of "two thirds vote"?
The language, "two-thirds vote of the local legislative body," could
mean:

(1) two-thirds of the total number of places, including vacancies;

(2) two-thirds of the existing membership, excluding vacancies; (3) twothirds of the members present at a meeting, when one or more are absent
but a quorum is present; (4) two-thirds of those voting when one or more
present are recorded as not voting and the favorable vote is two-thirds
of a quorum; or (5) two-thirds of those voting when one or more present

28nebates, p. 1126.
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of a quorum.
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are recorded as not voting and the favorable vote is less than two-thirds

Cases might be found to support any of the above interpretations:
The Supreme Court of the United States, in a case involving the 18th Amendment and an interpretation of the constitutional provision that "The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution," said:

"The two-thirds vote in

each House which is required in proposing an amendment is a vote of twothirds of the members present--assuming the presence of a quorum--and not
a vote of two-thirds of the entire membership, present and absent. 11 29
In the case of Doyle v. Torrence, 203 Tenn. 175, 310 S.W.2d 425 (1958),
•
the Tennessee Supreme Court has given an interpretation of this provision.
This involved a private act for the City of Nashville; 19 of the total
membership of 21 were present, eight voted for the act, two against, and
nine abstained.

Noting that the Constitutional Convention had adopted

Robert's Rules of Order as its governing parliamentary authority, the court
referred to section 48, p. 204, and quoted the following:
Two-thirds Vote. A two-thirds vote means two-thirds
of the votes cast, ignoring blanks which should never be
counted. This must not be confused with a vote of twothirds of the members present, oi two-thirds of the members,
terms sometimes used in by-laws. To illustrate the difference: Suppose 14 members vote on a question in a meeting
of a society where 20 are present out of a total membership
of 70, a two-thirds vote would be 10; a two-thirds vote of
the members present would be 14; and a vote of two-thirds
of the members would be 47.
The court observed that the case required interpretation of the language "two-thirds vote of the local legislative body," and concluded that

29National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 64 L. Ed. 946, 40 S. Ct.
486 (1920).

'27

this fell under the last example quoted above from Robert's Rules of Order,
which in the instant case meant "two-thirds membership of the 'local legi•lative body' ••• would be 14."

This decision was reinforced by the -.

following:
on-

'

lil>s>.
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It is noted that on pages 1121, 1122, 1123 and 1124
of the judicial proceedings of the Limited Constitutional
Convention this question came up for discussion. In this
discussion Mr. Pope was just as positive that the language
was clear and unambiguous and meant "two-thirds vote by
the Local Legislative Body, that means, and I don't think
it could mean anything else than two-thirds of the full
membership of that body." Others in the discussion at the
Constitutional Convention had a different idea. It was
finally concluded though, in this Constitutional Convention, that the provision as submitted to the people would
not be changed or added to but that they would just agree
after the discussion was had about it that it meant as Mr.
Pope had interpreted it to mean.
Of course this discussion of the members of the Limited
Constitutional Convention on this question is not binding on
us but it has long been settled in this State that if there
was any doubt about the meaning of the Constitution that those
having doubt about it had the obligation first of examining
the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention which has
adopted this provision and see from the proceedings what the
framers of the resolution intended it to be. The first case
that applied this ruling was State v. Cloksey, 37 Tenn. 482,
decided just one hundred years ago.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals has ruled on a case involving a private act for Henry County which received approving votes of 11 members
of the Quarterly County Court; two passed, two were absent, and three
positions were vacant.

Reversing the chancellor, the Court of Appeals

construed the language of this amendment as requiring approving votes of
two-thirds of the total number of squires authorized for the Quarterly
County Court (in this instance, 18), and held that the act was not properly approved because it failed to receive at least 12 affirmative votes.
A petition for certiorari was denied by the Tennessee Supreme Court in a
per curiam opinion which indicated support of the decision by the Court

29

MajoritY when a joint election is held
The alternative to approval by a legislative body, which may be
•pecified in the private act, is "approval in an election by a majority
of those voting in said election in the municipality or county affected."
When such an election is held simultaneously with another election,
the question might arise, as it has arisen in other states, whether this
provision would require a majority of all the votes cast for candidates
and/or on all issues on the ballot, or simply a majority of those votes
cast on the question of approving the private act.

Some cases can be

found which might seem to lend some support to the former view, but they
have involved unusual constitutional or statutory requirements in most
instances.
view:

•
'
'•
•
•
•
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The weight of authority seems to be in favor of the latter

that only a majority of the votes cast on the question of approv-

ing the·private act would be required.

The following discussion in the

Convention also supports this view:
Mr. Miller: . . • suppose the legislature submitted
this bill for approval in a general election, under your
wording would that not require a majority of all voting in
that general election to approve, rather than a majority
voting on a particular bill?
Mr. Pope: No, sir it would not; I don't think there
is any doubt about that.

Mr. Miller: Aren't we leaving a loophole for the
court to construe that to mean you would have to have a
majority of all voting in the election to approve the
bill?
Mr. Pope:

All I could say was if I was on the court

action has been taken before publication of the bound volume of acts. The
1974 volume contained 11 such statements; seven for acts that set no deadline for local action, one set a deadline of September 1, 1974, and three
called for referendums in the regular August 1974 election, on November 4,
1974, and on the third Tuesday in May 1975 •

..
..
..
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I certainly would not construe it that way, but I don't
1ee how there can be any question when you say "•aid election," that is election to this same thing . • • •

f
'
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Mr. Miller:

'

thereon.
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Mr. Pope:

To cl•rify it, couldn't we •ay voting
Well, it wouldn't hurt, I think.

Mr. McGinness: Let's avoid cluttering it up now with
little immaterial .1111endments • • • • I don't think the •uggestion he made is well taken; I think it is clear •• , .32
Section 157 of the Kentucky Constitution prohibits any city froa incurring an indebtedness above its annual income "without the asaent of twothirds of the voters thereof, voting at an election to be held for that
purpose."

Construing this provision, the Kentucky Court of Appeal• •aid:

"It is conceded that the proposed bond issue received the assent of tvothirds of those voting on the question, but not the assent of two-thirds
of those voting at the election.

At first the court was inclined to the

view that the assent of two-thirds of those voting at the election was
necessary. • • •

But that and other cases announcing the •ame doctrine

was •ubsequently overruled

. . • and

it now may be regarded as finally

settled that the constitutional requirement is fully met by assent of twothirds of those voting on the question." 33
The Missouri court reached the same conclusion.

"The first point

urged is that two-thirds of all voters of Kansas City 'voting at an election to be held for that purpose' (Const. 1875, sec. 12, art. 10) failed
and neglected to. vote in favor of the issuance of the bonds . • • • twothirds of all persons who voted at the general election, held at the aame

32Debates, pp. 1122-1123.
3Jiiall v. Elizabethtown, 200 Ky. 321, 254 S.W. 893 (1923).
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time and places, did not vote to issue the bonds • • • • [held to) mean
two-thirds of those who actually vote for or against the given propositi'on, whether such two-thirds be two-thirds or not of all the voters taking part in the election otherwise. • • •u34
The Kentucky and Missouri constitutions contain the phrase "to be
held for that purpose," which ia missing from the Tennessee provision.
However, the context of the Tennessee amendment and particularly the words
"in said election" would seem to indicate a very clear intention that an
election would be held for such a purpose.

The Kentucky and Missouri

"voting at an election" is so close to the Tennessee "voting in ·said election" that no distinction in meaning would seem to be possible.
Indiana court said:

As the

"If, from the language of the statute [or constitu-

tion], it is intended that a special vote shall be cast upon a proposition, and the law does not expressly require the majority of the votes

•
•
•
•
•I
•
•
•

cast at the general or regular election to adopt the measure, then it
aatters not whether the votes are cast at the same poll as is used for
the election of officers.

All that is necessary in such case is that the

measure should receive a majority of the votes cast for or against
i t. • .

1135

I

34
ltansas City v. Orear, 277 Ko. 303, 210 S.W. 392 (1919).
3Ssouth Bend v. Lewis, 138 Ind. 512, 37 N.E. 986 (1894) •
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CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY.AND.kNALYSIS OF AMENDMENT NO. 7

1;·

j

t

This is the "optional home rule amendment," reproduced in full bel9w,
On the following pages its provisions are analyzed in detail, in the order

in which they appear in the amendment .
Be it resolved, That the Constitution of Tennessee be
amended by adding to Section 9 of Article XI the following:
Any municipality may by ordinance submit to its qualified voters in a general or special election the question:
"Shall this municipality adopt home rule"?
In the event of an affirmative vote by a majority of
the qualified voters voting thereon, and until the repeal
thereof by the same procedure, such municipality shall be
a home rule municipality, and the General Assembly shall
act with respect to such home rule municipality only by
laws which are general in terms and effect.
Any municipality after adopting home rule may continue
to operate under its existing charter, or amend the same, or
adopt and thereafter amend a new charter to provide for its
governmental and proprietary powers, duties and functions,
and for the form, structure, personnel and organization of
its government, provided that no charter provision except
with respect to compensation of municipal personnel shall be
effective if inconsistent with any general act of the General
Assembly and provided further that the power of taxation of
such municipality shall not be enlarged or increased except
by General Act of the General Assembly. The General Assembly shall by general law provide.the exclusive methods by
which municipalities may be created, merged, consolidated
and dissolved and by which municipal boundaries may be altered.
A charter or amendment 118Y be proposed by ordinance of
any home rule municipality, by a charter co11DDission provided
for by Act of the General Assembly and elected by the qualified voters of a home rule municipality voting thereon or,
in the absence of such act of the General Assembly, by a
charter coDDDission of seven (7) members, chosen at large not
more often than once in two (2) years, in a municipal election pursuant to petition for such election signed by qualified voters of a home rule municipality not less in number
than ten (10%) per cent of those voting in the then most recent general municipal election •

-

•
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131, 350 S.W.2d 601 (1961), involving interpretation of a subsequent provision in this amendment for election of a charter commission.
St~te

laws on special elections
State election laws seem to provide sufficient guidance to hold a

home rule election as contemplated by Amendment No. 7.

The Tennessee Su-

preme Court has held that the state election laws apply to municipal elections39 and the sweeping language of present State law (TCA 2-103), com-
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prehensively revised in 1972, clearly includes such elections:

"All elec-

tions for public office, for candidacy for public office, and on questions
submitted to the people shall be conducted under this title."
Who may initiate a home rule election?
In view of the specification that the question of whether to adopt
home rule is to be submitted "by ordinance," it would appear that the municipal legislative body (council, commission, board of aldermen, etc.)
ie the sole authority which may initiate an election.

The only exception

would seem to be that the people could do so when a city charter provides
for initiating an ordinance by petition.
is

The language of Amendment No. 7

that "Any municipality may by ordinance • • • • "; the amendment does not

stipulate that "The legislative body of a municipality may by ordinance"
submit the question.

However, Mr. Sims, in explaining this provision to

the Convention, said, "it means ••• an ordinance adopted by its legislative

3911 The election laws of the State ••• come within this class of general State-wide laws, applicable to municipalities, as well·as other subdivieiona and arms of the State government. • • • To permit enactment of
special election laws in the different municipalities of the State would
utterly destroy the essential uniformity of our entire election system and
.. chinery." Clark v. Vaughn, 177 Tenn. 76, 146 S.W.2d 351 (1941).
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Frequency of holding elections
The amendment is silent as to the frequency of holding elections to

L

1

vote on whether to sdopt home rule.

It might be said that a municipal

governing body, or the people by initiative, could order such elections
with excessive frequency to vote home rule in or out (the second paragraph
provides for "repeal thereof by the same procedure").

The good sense of

the citizens and governing body of a municipality, plus the expense of
holding such elections, should be a sufficient guarantee against such abuse .
Meaning of "qualified voters"
Amendment No. 7 empowers a municipality to submit the question of
adopting home rule "to its qualified voters."

The words "qualified voter,"

used as a qualification of a candidate for office, do not mean the same as
when used as a prerequisite to voting.

In the former sense it has been

held that a person need only meet the constitutional requirements and need
not be a registered voter.41

The reference here obviously means the "qual-

ified voters" who are entitled to vote in an election, and in this sense
the Tennessee courts have ruled that a person must be a "registered voter. 1142
As in other elections, then, only "registered voters" would be permitted
to vote on the question of adopting home rule.

***
In the event of an affirmative

40Debates, p. 1010.
41 Trammel v. Griffin, 141 Tenn. 139, 207 S.W. 726 (1918).
42 state v. Weaver, 122 Tenn. 198, 122 s.w. 465 (1909).
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vote by a majority of the qualified voters voting thereon,
There seems to be little doubt as to the meaning of this clause, and
no possibility of disagreement as to its interpretation.
on" clearly refers back to "the question:

The word "there-

'Shall this municipality adopt

ons
home rule?'"

Under the discussion of Amendment No. 6 cases were cited to

llaph
the effect that only a majority of those voting on a particular question
llf
)f

ii needed, if the question is submitted at a general election in which candidates for office and_possibly other questions are on the

sam~

ballot

lbuse.
(1ee pp.

2~-31

).

There should be no doubt that an "affirmative vote by

a majority of the qualified voters voting thereon" can mean only a major,f

ity of those voting on this particular

questi~n.

llr,"
and until the repeal thereof
by the same procedure,
This provision permits a city to terminate home rule by the same pro'qual-

cedure previously outlined for adopting home rule; that is, submission by

1

ordinance to the qualified voters at a general or special election on the

. . . .42

question:

ed

•I
I
I

•

"Shall this municipality repeal home rule."

An affirmative vote

of the qualified (registered) voters voting on this question would result
in termination of home rule, and the provisions of Amendment No. 7 (except

the three sentences to be noted later) would no longer apply to the municipality.

Its charter would remain the same until amended, subject to the

provisions of Amendment No. 6.

***
such municipality shall be
a home rule municipality,

38

After a favorable vote on the question of adopting home rule, and
"until the repeal thereof," the status of the municipality is that of a
~'home

As such i t vill be subject to, and vill be ·entitled to, the rights and privileges of the provisions of Amendment No. 7

•
•

rule municipality."

and any legislation thereunder.

***
and the General Assembly shall
act vith respect to such home
rule municipality only by laws
vhich are general in terms and
effect.
Type of legislative action
The vords "shall act vith respect to" vould seem to be all-inclusive,
covering any type of action.

All legislation affecting a "home rule •unic-

ipality" in any vay, then, must be "general in terms and effect."

These

are the key words in the entire amendment, as to the means of legislative
control over a "home rule municipality."

It seems obvious that the inten-

tion was to prohibit private acts altogether.

Whether this necessarily

follows depends on the construction given by the courts.
The possibility of a legislature circumventing a prohibition against
special legislation through the device of "general" leghlation applying
to very narrow population brackets has been discussed in the foregoing
analysis of Amendment No. 6 (see pp.

19-21 ).

As an example, an act

might be drafted as a "general" act to apply to all municipalities having
a population of 174,000 to 175,000, according to the 1970 or any subsequent
Federal census.

•

<.

.

-

.

The population of Knoxville, according to the 1970 Federal

..
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lld

census was 174,587, and no other city would fall within this bracket.
act would be

II

The

11
genera 111 i n it s t erms, II because t here wou ld be no re f erence

to the City of Knoxville, but the words "and effect" should invalidate
" ' :n7

It·

the act.
Early in the home rule movement the New York Court of Appeals defined

II
II

the critical role of the courts in this respect:

inquire whether (the act] is general or local 'in its effect.'

Home rule

for cities, adopted by the people with much ado and after many years of

II

agitation, will be •• -. a form of words and little else, if the courts
in applying the new tests shall ignore the new spirit that dictated their

•II

adoption.

The municipality is to be protected in its autonomy against

the inroads of evasion. 1143

In another case an act general in its terms,

applying to all cities with a population over 1,000,000 (New York City

llve,
le

only was affected), was declared invalid under the New York Home Rule
44
Allendment because it was not "general both in terms and in effect."

1111nic-

We have found only one case decided since adoption of the amendments

tive

in 1953 which gives a clue to the court's position on this point, and it

l.n-

is encouraging.

II

An act which by a population classification applied only

to Gibson County, and therefore was not made subject to local approval un..r Amendment No. 6, was thrown out because it was not general "in effect. 1145

lie

lffact of classifying cities

II

We have taken note of the past practice of classification on a popu-

I

lng

43

llnt

44

lal
I

"We must go farther and

In re Elm Street in City of New York, 246 N.Y. 72, 158 N.E. 24 (1927).

Osborn v. Cohen, 272 N.Y. 55, 4 N.!.2d 289 (1936).

45
Lawler v. Mccanless, 220 Tenn. 342, 417 S.W.2d 548 (1967).

..· -

~

•'

40
lation basis to make an apparent general act apply only to one city, and
that this could be a device to circumvent the constitutional prohibition
'against special or private legislation.

46

Early in the Convention several proposals were made to prevent auch
subterfuges:

by fixing the number of classes, the minimum number of cities

in any class, or the population limits of the classes.

These were not

accepted, primarily because it was felt that this would have unduly circumscribed the discretion of the General Assembly.

•II
•

However, many delegates

spoke against the practice, and none defended it, clearly indicating a
consensus of the Convention that circumvention of this provision through
the device of the single city population bracket should not be permitted.
Mr. Sims made this explanation to the Convention, with regard to withdraval of restrictions on classification of cities:
•• that particular part of the resolution was intended
merely to prevent a subterfuge, and was completely ancillary
to the prohibition of private legislation as affecting municipalities • • • • the legislature has the right, and has been
classifying cities. I felt we vent too deeply into that, and
this restores to the legislature its own judgment and leaves
the question purely one to be determined by the court as to
whether or not it is a private or general act • • . • 47
It is possible that general laws, incorporating a bona fide classification of home rule municipalities on a population basis, could apply to
one city only or to a very few cities in each class.

This would be the

result if a relatively small number of municipalities vote to become "home

46
Acts applying to counties with populations of 25,000 to 25,100, ·
12,980 to 13,000, and 25,907 to 25,909, respectively, were sustained in
Murphy v. State, 114 Tenn. 531, 86 S.W. 711 (1904), Taylor Theater v.
Mountain City, 189 Tenn. 690, 227 S.W.2d 30 (1950), and Wilson v. State,
143 Tenn. 55, 224 S.W. 168 (1919).
47Debates, pp. 1010, 1014.

II
rule municipalities."

For example, general legislation applying to "home

rule municipalities" might be passed for those in population brackets of
under 5,000, 5,000 to 15,000, 15,000 to 100,000, and over 100,000,

llh
cities

II
111egates

•

accord~

ing to the last Federal census or any subsequent Federal census; this would
probably be a classification free of any taint of private legislation in
disguise, but if only one city in any bracket had voted to become a "home
rule municipality" it neceasarily would be the only one affected.

But it

might be questioned that legislation applying only to "home rule municipalities" is "general" legislation.

There could be no objection 1f gen-

eral laws apply to all cities in a reasonable population bracket, instead
of being restricted to "home rule municipalities."
The extent of protection against legislative action that would be
afforded by electing to operate under Amendment No. 7 seems to depend on

II

•
•,i•
•
•
•
•
•

two factors:

(1) whether the General Assembly is disposed to pass "gen-

eral" acts that are actually private through the device of classification
by population, and (2) whether the courts sustain such acts as being
"general in terms and effect."

***
Any municipality after adopting
home rule may continue to operate
under ita existing charter,

'home

This language is clear enough.
turbed.

The existing charter is left undis-

An important point to note is that the existing charter may no

longer be amended or repealed by a private act of the General Assembly,

n

although it may have been a charter enacted by private act;

Changes may

take place only by action of the 111UDicipality under subsequent provisions
of this amendment, or by general laws that supersede the city's charter

42

(this point is discussed later on).

**•
or amend the same, or adopt and
thereafter amend a new charter
to provide for its governmental
and proprietary powers, duties
and functions, and for the form,
structure, personnel and organization of its government,
This clause empowers a

muni~ipality,

by following the procedure out-

lined in a subsequent section, to determine on its own initiative its
"powers, duties and functions, and ••• form, structure, personnel and
organization of its government."

This is a broad grant of authority, and

would seem to encompass any matters normally found in municipal charters,
but it is subject to the important exceptions discussed under the aucceeding two clauses.

The sweeping nature of this grant was indicated by two

Convention delegates:
Mr. McGinness: Now, a municipality has, as I have
stated, only such powers as are expressly delegated to it;
then, if this resolution be embodied in our Constitution,
it would have all power except insofar as it might be restrained by general laws. This is not academic; it is
fundamental. In my view, it is a dangerous innovation. •

.48

Mr. Sims: After you get under the optional plan, ye~ do
not acquire any powers except those which are not contrary
to the general acts or any future general acts of the legislature • • • • 49

48

Debates, p. 959.

49 Debates, p. 1012.
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"' "' "'
provided that no charter provision
except with respect to compensation
of municipal personnel shall be effective if inconsistent with any
general act of the General Assembly
General acts supersede charters of home rule municipalities
The above clause makes any general law prevail over a home rule municipality's charter to the extent that the latter is "inconsistent" with the
former, "except with respect to compensation of municipal personnel."
Thus the municipality's charter is supreme as to compensation but must
defer to general laws on all other matters.
The reference is to "any general act" and not simply to general acts
passed with respect to home rule municipalities.

Nor is it limited to

general acts passed after adoption of the amendment.

Accordingly, it ap-

pears that the charter of a home rule municipality cannot be "inconsistent"
with any provision of a general act a

~P~~d

before or after the amendment

became effective, except as to "compensation of municipal personnel."
Said Mr. Miller to the Convention:

"I want to make it clear that no mu-

nicipality can act in regard to any matter either of local or of statewide concern if the state itself has already entered the field by general

law, and preempted that field by an inconsistent provision or regulation. 1150
The word "inconsistent" is subject to interpretation.

Direct con-

flict with a general act would seem to be prohibited, but would a standard

50Debates, p. 1045.
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"II
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~

1'

in a ptivate act, as in the field of public health, be "inconsistent" i f

•f

more severe than the standard of a general act?

r

II •
~-

•.

II
II
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If the general acts are

•silent on a particular point, may the point be covered by a home rule·
charter provision?

May a new c.orporate power, such as power to own and

operate a municipal bus system, be added?
In one case it was held that a city could not prevent the sale of
milk that had passed minimum State tests.
enact •

"Any ordinance which it aay

. must be reasonable and not in conflict with the general law.n5l

In another case, under a statute authorizing cities to impose higher
than State standards on milk and milk products sold within their limits,
the Court said:

An ordinance enacted in the exercise of police power
is not necessarily inconsistent with a State law on the
same subject because the city provides for greater restrictions or makes higher standards than is provided or
made by statute. Walker v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 95 Kan.
702, 149 P. 677 • • • • But in doing so the city may not
pass an ordinance which ignores the State's own regulatory
acts, or deny rights granted by the State or grant rights
denied by the State and thus in effect nullify the State
law. 52
The City of Lincoln,

Ne~raska,

governed by a home rule charte• adopted

under a constitutional grant which permitted it to "frame a charter for
its own government,

consiste~t

with and subject to the constitution and

laws of this state," passed an ordinance prohibiting the sale of liquor
to minors.

A state law also prohibited such sales, but had the added qual-

ification "knowing them to be such," so that a vendor might escape on a
plea and-proof that he did not know the buyer was a minor.

The court held

51Nashville Pure Milk Co. v. Shelbyville, 192 Tenn. 194, 240 S.W.2d
239 (1951).
52Beasley v. Fayetteville, 196 Tenn. 407, 268 S.W.2d 330 (1954).

II
. . if
are

'

45
that the two provisions were not inconsistent, that both were directed
toward the same legislative purpose and the city ordinance was simply a
"stricter regulation," and that the word "inconsistent [as] used in a
sense applicable to legislation [means] contradictory in the eenee of
legislative provisions which cannot coexist, not mere lack of uniformity
in detail. "S 3
An ordinance providing for city tax liens, adopted by Lubbock, Texas,

under its home rule charter, was sustained as not being inconsistent with
.er
'.ts,

•II
•
•

the general laws of Texas which provided for liens only for state and
county taxes.

As illustrations, the court said a city could adopt supple-

mentary methods of collecting taxes, or could restrict motor buses to
certain streets, or could fix telephone rates in the absence of a atate
law on this subject, but could not fix a different or more ell:tensive penalty for crime than that fixed by general laws; the opinion defined "incon1iatent" to mean "in conflict with" and "repugnant to. 11 54

In another

caae from Texas, the Federal courts sustained a provision in Dallas' home
rule charter which provided for tax liens to attach aa of January l each
year as not being in conflict with a general law providing that the attach-

I

ment would occur at the time of assessment.SS

n~

•
•.rld
•
•II

A Florida case held that a general law authorizing the governing body
of a municipality to issue bonds for street improvements simply by reso-

quallution was not "inconsistent" with a provision in the city's special act
charter requiring a two-thirds favorable vote of the electors to approve

53Bodkin v. State, 132 Neb. 535, 272 N.W. 547 (1937) •
54In re Robertson, 20 F. Supp. 270 (1936).
55
Dallas v. Crippen, 171 F.2d 526 (1948), cert. denied 336 U.S. 937 •

"II
"
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any bond issue.56
In passing on whether a provision in an act repealing all prior laws
"incc;>nsistent" therewith actually repealed a prior act on the same aubje.ct,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey said:

'
'
'
'
'
'Ill

The courts do not favor repealers by implication • . •
when two entirely different schemes or methods or procedure
are provided for by the two, it will be presumed that the
Legislature was cognizant of that fact. • • • If it was intended ••• to destroy the one, it would have said so by
express words. • •• The dictionary meaning of inconsistent
is logicslly incompatible; contradictory; inharmonious •
• • • The methods of procedure are not inconsistent. They
are different, it is true, but they may exist side by side.57
The supremacy of general acts under this clause would seem not to ex-

•

tend to those general acts which are optional for adoption by municipalities.
In Mink v. Memphis, 222 Tenn. 216, 435 S.W.2d 114 (1968), the court held
that a provision in an optional general law which required notice and a
hearing to remove members of a housing authority board did not apply, but
instead the provisions of the city charter would govern.

Ill
Ill

"'
"'
"
"•

On the other

hand it seems unlikely that a city could adopt a different provision from
that found in TCA 6-1003, requiring written notice within 90 days after
an accident if a suit is to be brought against a city for injuries alleged
to be incurred· on account of negligent conditions of streets or sidewalks.
Very limited protection against general acts
This clause would enable the General Assembly to pass truly general
acts that are not constitutionally prohibited, affecting home rule municipalities in any way except as to compensation of municipal personnel.

56

Lake Alfred v. Lawless, 102 Fla. 84, 135 So. 895 (1931) •

57oakland v. Board of Conservation and Development, 98 N.J.L. 99, 118
Atl. 787 (1922).

I
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•
•

Of course this would not be a result of becoming a home rule municipality,
because the General Assembly may do likewise with a municipality that haa

laws

.ect,

no~

•
•
•
•

would have the added protection that no general act .could override a

elected to come under Amendment No. 7.

The home rule municipality

charter provision relating to compensation of its personnel, a benefit
not enjoyed by the non-home rule municipality.
tion, gave this explanation:
amendment pass a law to force

Mr. Sims, in the Conven-

" ••• the legislature cannot under the
• • the city to pay minimU1D salariei to

the employees that are hired by that particular city. 11 58
It should be noted that it must be a charter provision to benefit

o ex-

from this protection--a general act could supersede an ordinance provision

.ties,

relating to compensation but it could not override a charter provision.

eld

II

A charter provision that all salaries shall be fixed by ordinance would
probably assure protection against any general act interference, without

.t
r

actually fixing the amounts of compensation in the charter--generally

llm

conaidered to be an undesirable feature.
Meaning of "compensation"

-ed

The word "compensation" is universally interpreted to include sal-

••

'•
•
•
•
•

ariea and wages.

Does the term include "fringe benefits" such as retire-

11ent and pension plans, medical and hospitAlization plans, group life and
accident insurance, sick leave pay, and ao on?
General Regulation No. 1 of the U. S. Wage Stablization Board defined
.... ea, salaries or other compensation" to include "vacation and holiday

,.J'lletlt•, . . . employer contributions to or payments of insurance or

118

.

~

.

SL

.

""Debates, p. 1011.
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welfare benefits, employer contributions to a pension fund or annuity, payments in kind . .

-

I

•tion:

1111

" Court cases have held the following to be compensa-

an annual cash clothing allowance to firemen; the use of a car· that

may be withdrawn at the will of _the employer; hospital, medical and surgi-

1111

cal bills paid by an employer; funeral expenses; weekly payments for in-

II

juries or for total or partial disability; the right to receive hospitalization or medical treatment; and vacation leave with pay.

•II
..

Retirement and

pension plans have usually been included in this term but occasionally
have been excluded.
In a leading case involving group insurance, the Tennessee Supreme
Court observed that a city without doubt has authority to increase its
employees' salaries, and, "This, in effect, is what i t did when it took

II

out said policy of group insurance ••• there can be no objection if, as
an economic measure, it is to the best interest of the municipalities to
adopt it. 1159
In view of the foregoing it would seem likely that the courts would
hold any such fringe benefits to be "compensation," including such items
as uniforms and equipment furnished to city employees.

If so, it would

mean that charter provisions of a home rule municipality would prevail in
the determination of salaries and any other remunerative benefits for
city employees.

***
and provided further that the power
of taxation of such municipality
shall not be enlarged or increased

59 Thompson v. Memphis, 147 Tenn. 658, 251 S.W. 46, 27 A.L.R. 1257 (1922).

'
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I.,
•

except by General Act of the General

pay-

Assembly .

ensa-

It is obvious that under this clause "the power of taxation" cannot

:ar that
.urgi--

be "enlarged or increased" by locally adopted amendments to the charter.

Iii in-

Thi• IDllY be done only by general act, and we shall see that a subsequent

.tali-

provision in this amendme.nt limits the power of the General Assembly in

•

and

•

thi• respect, even by general act (seep. 62) .
The General Assembly loses none of its power to control taxation by

lly

•le

municipalities, 60 but-it is deprived of its power to do so by private
act• with respect to home rule municipalities.

cant difference, in that a few legislators almost invariably determine

'k

tbe fate of private bills, while general bills are subject to more thorouah legislative consideration, the power of pressure groups, etc.

·.f, as

Ito

A city, in becoming a home rule municipality, would be giving up the
capability of enlarging or increasing its powers of taxation by private

Id

•lin
•
•
•
•
•

This is a fairly signifi-

act.

Rumerous private acts have been passed for this purpose in the past;

a fev will be mentioned by way of illustration.

Four cities were author-

taed to levy a retail tax on beer sales by private acts; in the next ses-

Jld

aion all cities were authorized to do so by general act.
ect authorized the City of Memphis to levy
... ciaarettes.

reta~l

A 1955 private

sales taxes on liquor

Gatlinburg and Sevier County were authorized by a 1953

pri•ate act to levy a tax up to tW'O per cent on amounts paid for lodging
ec:coamodations at hotels and motels .
Tba private act system seems to have two virtues in this respect:

.. 60

such pciwer is complete and exclusively within the province of the
C...ral Aa1ellbly. Luehrman v. Taxing District, 70 Tenn. 425 (1879); Rail~ Y. Barria, 99 Tenn. 684, 43 s.w. 115 (1897) •

.1922)
.
~-

~{';..
. ~:- ..

~~~:~~~-·
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(1) pioneering by a few cities may lead to a general act that could not
be passed as a general act at the outset, and (2) it is adaptable to the
peculiar circumstances of a city; the lodging accommodations tax in Gatlinburg, a tourist center, is a good example.

• • *
The General Assembly shall by general law
provide the exclusive methods by which
municipalities may be created, merged, conaolidated and dissolved and by which municipal boundaries may be altered.
Application to all municipalities?
The Constitutional Convention shifted gears at this point.

The en-

tire amendment, except this and two other sentences, by its terms applies
only to "home rule municipalities."

This sentence relates to "municipali-

ties," and there is no qualifying language restricting its application to
home rule municipalities.

It might be contended that Amendment No. 7 was

the "Home Rule Amendment" and that its provisions were intended to apply
only to those cities electing to operate thereunder; however, the plain
meaning of the words seems to be against such a view.

The State Attorney

General's office has given an opinion that this provision prohibits annexation by private acts.
In addition to the use of the word "municipalities" without the qualifying words "home rule," there is the fact that this sentence comprehends
municipalities being "created."

Obviously an existing municipality, ellg-

ible to become a home rule municipality, cannot again be "created."

It

could be "merged," "consolidated" or "dissolved," but it could not again

;

1

I
I

I
I

•
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be "create d . "

This application to municipalities not yet brought into

existence, which obviously could not be "home rule municipalities," is

•
•
•
•
•
·-

p lies

11111-

80ae

-evidence that this sentence was intended to apply to all municipal--

ities.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has declared that "the real intention
vill always prevail over the literal sense of terms." 61 Therefore, analy•i• should go beyond the literal meaning of this sentence.

Although

agreement on intent is not clearly revealed, the Convention Debates pro...tde some clues as to the thinking of a few delegates on this point.
The first home rule resolution (No. 18) that was introduced by Mr •
Sims, the chief proponent of home rule, contained a provision that "aunicipal corporations • • • shall not be created by the General Assembly by
8 pecial

laws ••• [and] The General Assembly shall provide by general

law the methods by which new municipal corporations may be formed, munic-

r

ipal boundaries may be altered, municipal corporations may be merged or
consolidated, and municipal corporations may be dissolved."
Numerous resolutions on home rule were introduced and many of them
contained language similar to the foregoing--no material change occurred-only a condensation to make the sentence shorter.

Resolution No. 45, for

auiple, read, "shall provide by law the methods," and otherwise was
identical with the sentence finally adopted.

The first majority report

of the Committee on Home Rule included the same language as was finally
adopted, and this sentence reappeared without change in numerous subse'118Dt drafts that eventually became Amendment No. 7 •

•
•
•
ain

61Michie'a Digest of Tennessee Reports, Vol. 14, page 240, citing
._rous cases •
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Mr. Sims, in a convention speech, made this sti
to see if we have not • • • given to the people in

I

exclusive method of handling their own affairs in tl
tion, but leaving to the legislature the broader· p01
method of organizing municipalities, merging them,

1

extending their boundaries. 11 62
Resolution No. 118, without any change, was ev1
the Convention and by the voters as Amendment No. 7
the first time incorporated the optional home rule :
in each municipality.

It may be noteworthy that Mr

creating, merging, consolidating, and dissolving ci
boundaries, in his initial explanation that this re.
cities of Tennessee the option of adopting home rul<
to regulate their

own

affairs, to amend their

people in the municipality, and
cities by the same process •

own

c·

. . remove themse·
1163

The proponents of Amendment No. 7 were chiefly
ing all private acts for cities; at least two of th
Miller, did not look with much favor on the local a
Amendment No. 6.

Their first drafts would have app

quiring the General Assembly to deal with them by g
ification into four classes and not less than four
permitted.

When they shifted to the optional basis

the whole plan then would apply only to home rule D

62Debates, p. 915 •
63nebates, p. 1010 •

•
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.you
; the
-rpora-

all kinds of private acts, including those annexing territory, were prohibited only with respect to such 111unicipalities?

Oiniuion of the word

"such" before "111unicipalities" 111ay or uy not have been intentional--it
could have been an oversight.

But this line of thinking leads to ,the

incongruity of "creating" already existing ho111e rule 111unicipalities, as

•.a

the word "created" also appears in this sentence.
by

~

for

.tion
1ention
.their
.,;,;.ve the
•

the111

llf the

•
111e

rule

A conclusion that the provision applies to all municipLlltte.s is
supported by the Tennessee Supre111e Court's holding in the case of Frost
v. Chattanooga, 488 S.W.2d 370 (1972), in which a purported "aenetal"
act with a population classification 111&king it applicable in Hamil.ton
County only was invalidated because it "was not drafted to create a class
of 111unicipalities who had similar annexation-taxation problenia with fringe
population areas, but seeks to clothe a local act for Chattanooga in tet'lllll
of a general act."

The court noted that the "constitution in very clear

language prohibits the Legislature from prescribing any 111ethod•of altering 111unicipal boundaries except by general law," and added,. ''we do not

.ibit-

"lr.

bold that the Legislature could not act to alter 111unicipal boundaries by
legislation valid as a general law under the classification doctrine, but
we are not able to conceive of any circu111Stances where such would be

~s,

re-

.lass-

•
•
•
•-

that

.that
.!

valid."
General acts available for incorporation
The effect of this provision is that municipalities 111&y be "created"
(incorporated) only under existing or new general acts.
time three general laws are available:

At the present

TCA 6-101 !.t.!!!l.·• providing for

a aayor-alder111en for111 of government, TCA 6-1801 to 6-2313, for a c01lllllission-

-.nager for111, and TCA 6-3001 to 6-3618, the "modified city 111&nager-council

54

charter."

The prevailing practice of past years, incorporation by private

act, is no longer available.

***
A charter or amendment may be proposed by ordinance of any home rule
municipality,
This is the first of three procedures for proposing a new charter or
an amendment to an existing charter.
duly enacted ordinance.

The governing body may do so by a

The people could also do so if a charter provides

for the enactment of ordinances under the initiative procedure.

***
by a charter commission provided for
by Act of the General Assembly and
elected by the qualified voters of a
home rule municipality voting thereon
The second procedure is the election of a charter commission "provided
for by Act of the General Assembly."

The word "Act" standing alone raises

a question as to whether it could be a private act.

Unquestionably the

General Assembly could provide by gener.al act for the, election of charter
commissions in all cities electing to follow this route, but could it pass
a private act for a particular city?

The language "a charter commisaion"

and "a home rule municipality" might be construed in the singular, as an
intention that such an act could apply to only one city, and that this was
intended to be an exception to the preceding provision in this amendlllent·
that "the General Assembly shall act with respect to such home rule aunicipality only by laws which are general in terms and effect."
The last part of this clause would seem to require that any such act

£ $.
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rivate

of the General Assembly provide for election of charter commission members
by a majority of the qualified (registered) voters voting thereon in the
election--although "majority" is not spelled out it 1e clearly implied,

**•
or, in the absence of such act of
the General Aasembly, by a charter
r or

commission of •even (7) members,

a

choaen at large not more of ten than

vi dee

once in two (2) years, in a municipal election pursuant to petition
for such election signed by gualified voters of a home rule municipality not less in number than ten (10)
per cent of those voting in the then
most recent general municipal election.

vided

This, the third procedure, may be used only "in the absence" of an
act by the General Assembly providing for a charter commission; if the
General Assembly passes an act this procedure would no longer be available.
The question of whether the whole of Amendment No. 7 can be placed
1Dto operation by a municipal election without implementing legislation
bJ the General Assembly has already been considered.

Of a similar nature

la tbia provision authorizing local action to effect charter changes, and
Oii

thia issue we have a clear ruling by the Tennessee Supreme Court that

lbe provision is self-executing.64

64waahington County Election Commission v. Johnson City, 209 Tenn.

'

~' .··•

i 1

•I

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•I
..•
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The language seems to be self-explanatory.

Action would be initiated

by a petition signed by qualified (registered) voters of the city not leas
in number than 10 per cent of the total vote cast in the "then lllOSt recent
general municipal election."

The specification of "general municipal elec-

tion" would seem to mean a regularly scheduled election, as provided in
the charter, for the election of officers; it would appear to rule out any
special election such as one to fill a vacancy or to vote on a bond iaaue,
etc.

"A regular or general election is one which recurs at stated inter-

vale as fixed by law; it is one which occurs at stated intervals without
any 1uperinducing cause other than the efflux of time. 11 65

"The words

'general election' . . • when used with reference to city elections, without any qualifying words, must mean the election for municipal officers
in general. 11 66
The charter commission members would be elected "at large" (from the
entire city instead of by wards or districts), in a "municipal election."
A special election could be called for this purpose only (this was done
in the Johnson City case), or they could be elected in a municipal election held for another purpose.
To whom would the petition be submitted?
this point.

The amendment is ailent on

Would the petition go to the city's governing body, which

would in turn call on the county election commission to hold the election,
or would the petition be presented directly to the county election comaisaion?

The latter procedure probably would apply.

Upon aubmiasion of

131, 350 S.W.2d 601 (1961).
65Allen v. Tobin, 155 Neb. 212, 51 N.W.2d 338 (1952).
66 castle v. Schroeder, 79 Neb. 759, 113 N.W. 192 (1907).

-
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llitiated
not less

•

recent
elec;-

ied in

•proper petition (if no act has been passed by the Gen~ral Assembly), the
countY election .commission of the county in which the municipality is lo-cated apparently would be responsible for conducting such

an

election.

There is nothing in the amendment indicating that the petition should
first go to the governing body of the municipality, and this would seem_

l!l>ut any

to be a wholly unnecessary procedure.

~iaeue,

in the case, Washington County Election Commission v. Johnson City, supra,

9'nter-

by implication seems to support this conclusion; in that case the city

lhout

bad asked for an injunction to restrain the election commission from hold-

rds

I

Although this issue was not raised

ing the election.

***

with-

It shall be the duty of the legislative body of such municipality
•

to publish any proposal so made

the
tion."

The legislative body (council, commission, board of mayor and alder-

llne

MD, etc.) is required to "publish" whatever has been proposed by any of

llec-

tbe three methods outlined above.

If an entirely new charter has been

proposed, it would be the duty of the legislative body to have it publhbed.
lch

lion,

·•
•
•
•

n of

What is the meaning of the word "publish"?

"By reference to Webster's

lev International Dictionary, the definition of 'publish' is, in part, as
follow•:

'To promulgate or proclaim, as a law or an edict.

lie in a newspaper, book, circular, or the like.'
•rinted without being published.

To make pub-

• • A book may be

It is published only when it is offered

lw eale or put in general circulation. n 67 From another case:

67 Buchanan v. Stamper, 272 Ky. 38, 113 S.W.2d 839 (1938) •

"The word
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'publish' means, primarily, to make known, and has the same significance
as the word 'circulate. 1168

Publication in a newspaper would appear to

be the most certain way to meet this requirement.

It might be possible

to print the proposal as a newspaper insert which can be removed and retained in pamphlet form (if the amendment is extensive), with an extra
quantity of the insert being printed for other distribution.

***
and to submit the same to its
qualified voters at the first
general state election which
shall be held at least sixty
(60) days after such publication
What must appear on ballot?
Although "same" refers back to "proposal," which would be the complete proposed amendment, this would not necessarily imply publishing the
entire amendment on the ballot (obviously impossible for an extended amendmentor new charter).

It is customary to

summari~e

on a ballot the mat-

ter to be voted upon, and quite often a law will prescribe the exact language; in the absence of any such prescription in this provision any reasonably clear swmnary of the proposed amendment should suffice.

The

ballo~

language could be included in an ordinance making the proposal, or could
be drafted by a charter commission; otherwise apparently this would be a
decision for a county election commission to make.
A key word here is "submit."

One case holds that "a ballot title

68 state v. Elder, 19 N.M. 393, 143 Pac. 482 (1914).
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11 1 cliuse which submits the proposed measure to the voters for their
idoption or rejection. • • • To submit means to present and leave to the
Jud11Mnt of the qualified voters. " 69 From another case:
belp from cases
ltra

so far as the cited authorities are pertinent they

l\lpport the idea that to 'submit' may include more than leaving the bare
document to the will of the voters.

II

"We -get little

180, 134 N.Y.S. 1030, 1032, aays:

For instance:

In re Norton, 75 Miac,

'In this election everything necea-

aary to reach the judgment of the qualified voters is a part of the sub-

I
I

siiiion; that is, all the proceedings preparatory to the election day,
lllcluding the count of ballots, and the return. "'70
The obvious purpose of publication in advance of the election is to
lllfol'11 the public.

The complete text of an amendment on the ballot could

DOt 1erve this purpose, and in the context of Amendment No. 7 it is ob-

Yioua that this was not intended.

ts

the

led amend-

I
I

matlan-

lbort ballot title something like the following:

ballot

could

le a
I
I
I
I

I

"as published in {nam-

1111 D9¥1paper or other medium) on {date or dates)." This should establish

'-Yood

j

any doubt a tie between the ballot title and the complete proposal.

ll.ection at which to be submitted

ny rea-

l

Perhaps there could be added to the

The proposal is to be submitted at the "first general state election"

eccarrtna at least 60 days after its publication.

"The rule is to exclude

tbe fint day and to include the last day of the specified period";71

for aa..ple, publication on September 3 would be 60 days ahead of an

:tie
-

6

'woland v. Hayward, 69 Colo, 181, 192 Pac. 657 {1920).

7
°iieva Corp. v. Smith, 353 Mo. 845, 184 S.W.2d 598 {1945).
71
52 .Aa. Jur. 343.

v.

I

1
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election on November 2 (27 days in September, plus 31 in October and 2 in
November).
Another point to be noted is the meaning of "general state election."
Party primaries may be immediately eliminated.72

At the time the amend-

ment was adopted, State law (TCA 2-1201) defined "state elections" to inelude "any election held for the choice of national, state, county, or
district officer or officers."
Elections of county officers and

judge~,

held concurrently with pri-

maries to nominate candidates for Governor, Public Service Commission, and
members of the General Assembly, on the first Thursday in August would
seem to qualify as "general state elections" when charter proposals can
be submitted to the voters.

,,
)

November elections for Governor, Public Ser-

vice Commissioners, and members of the General Assembly could also be used
for this purpose.

Mr. Sims, in explaining this provision to the Convention, said "it
further guarantees that amendments cannot be submitted more often than
once in every two years, because that is when you have your general elections.1173
In addition to "state election," this provision has the additional
qualifying word "general."

Although some cases construe a "general elec-

tion" to be one open to all voters, even though to fill a vacancy or to
vote on a particular question, the usual rule seems to be to classify

72,,A primary election is not an 'election' within the common acceptation of that term." 29 C. J. S. 15. ". • • primaries are not in reality
elections but merely nominating devices." Ledgerwood v. Pitts, 122 Tenn.
570, 125 s.w. 1036 (1910).
73
Debates, p. 908.
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thes e as "special elections," as distinguished from regularly
"general elections."

occurring

A conservative view would be to regard as "g

enera 1

.iate elections'' only those occurring at stated time interval~ for the
election of the officers mentioned above, and to rule out all others as
''special elections.''

* * •
and such proposal shall
become effective sixty (60)
days after approval by a

, and

majority of the qualified
voters voting thereon.
Only a simple majority of those "voting thereon" is required.

It

vould be expected that many voters casting ballots in a "general state
election" would not vote on a charter proposal, but a majority of the
I

total vote would not be needed--only a majority of those voting on this
particular question.

As to counting the dayR, the same general rule as

•tated above would seem to apply; "generally, time 'after' an act is
c09puted by excluding the day on 1.'hic!i the event took place. 11 74
The question may arise as to when the 60 days begins to run.

doe• "approval"--the "event"--take place?

When

On the day of the election, or

wben the vote is finally counted or offi~ially canvassed?

The answer

9i0Uld seem to be that "approval" takes place on the day of the election,
m:id that the day following is the first of the 60 days.

Construing an

Oreaon constitutional provision, under which an employers' liability act

lllad been adopted by the initiative procedure, in a case involving an

I

i,. _

74

52 Am. Jur. 352.

Ii

..
..
..
•
•
•
•
•
•
•II.
r
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accident on the day following the election, a Federal court 1aid:
A law proposed by the initiative • • . would take effect from and after the date of its approval, unless otherwise declared therein. . • • The law is adopted or rejected
at the time the vote is cast, and not when the official canvass is made. It may be suggested that under this view a
law may in fact be in force without those affected thereby
being aware of it; but this may be and often is true of acts
of Congress and other law-making bodies which take effect
from and after the date of their passage.75

***
The General Assembly shall not authorize
any municipality to tax incomes, estates
or inheritances, or to impose any other
tax not authorized by Sections 28 or 29
of Article II of this Constitution .
Application
This is the second sentence in the amendment that applies to all
aunicipali ties of the state.
explicit enough.

The language "any municipality" seems to be

The Convention Debates also leave no doubt on this point.

Nearly every draft contained such a provision, and every delegate who
spoke on this point indicated a definite intention that !!£. municipality
ahould be permitted to levy

~uch

nefarious taxes.

Said Mr. Manheim, refer-

ring to Mr. Pope's argument that the effect of Resolution No. 105 would be
to empower the legislature to levy an income tax and to authorize any
aunicipality to levy such a tax:

"I assure you that none of us who 1igned

Resolution No. 105 had the slightest intention of granting additional

75 Bradley v. Union Bridge & Construction Co., 185 F. 544 (1911). A
aillilar holding is found in Elsas v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Comlliasion, 318 Mo. 1004, 2 S.W.2d 796 (1928).

__

_.
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Powers of taxation to anybody.

So, we can quickly dispose of thi

b
• o jection by redrafting the proposal in language that will leave no doubt vbat-

aver as to our i ntent i ons. "76

-II

What taxes may be levied under this limitation?
Sections 28 and 29 of the Constitution set absolute limits beyond
which even the General Assembly cannot empower municipalities to tax.

II

Section 28 authorizes taxes on the following:
property;

I

real, personal and aizad

''Merchants, Peddlers, and privileges"; ''Merchant's Capital

uaed in the purchase of Merchandiae ·aold by him to non-residents and eent

I
I
I

beyond the State" (taxable at ad valorem property tax rate); and incOlle
from stocks and bonds.

The only reference to a specific tax in Section

29 is that "all property shall be taxed according to its value." Any

i

taxes not classified by the courts as falling under any of these cateaeries may not be authorized by the General Assembly to any municipality •

•

be
point.

1

•

authorize the ••• incorporated towns ••• to impose taxes for •
corporation purposes ••• in such a manner as shall be prescribed by lsw."
There are few cases in Tennessee challenging the delegation of the tax-

(fer•

Section 29 provides that the "General Assembly shall have power to

be

ing power to municipalities, possibly because of the broad language "to
blpose taxes" without any qualification whatsoever of the word "taxes."

y

lined

I
ll

C01n-

I
I

"The State ••• having full control of these agencies [municipalities]
••• aay authorize such agents to levy a tax • • • • 1177

However, Amend-

ment lo. 7 now limits the legislative power of delegation to those taxes

76
77

Debates, p. 947.
Hill v. Roberts, 142 Tenn. 215, 217 S.W.826 (1920).
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"authorized by Sections 28 or 29," with a further restriction that no
municipality may be authorized "to tax incomes, estates, or inheritances."
.. ·

The prohibition against a tax on estates or inheritances appears to
be insignificant; probably no municipality in the. United States levies

such a tax.
important.

But removal of the authority "to tax incomes" could be more
Would this prevent a Tennessee municipality from levying a

"payroll tax" on all persons working within its city limits?

In view of

the fact that this type of tax has been imposed by many cities in other
states and is viewed as an equitable, very productive aource of revenue
by many municipal leaders, this question will be analyzed at some length.
The language of Section 28 of Article II of the Tennessee Constitution
is that "the Legislature shall have power to tax Merchants, Peddlers, and
privileges, in such manner as they may from time to time direct."

A long

line of Tennessee cases have construed this provision as giving the General
Assembly plenary power to tax "privileges."
cate this trend.

A few quotations will indi-

"We take it the word privilege was intended to designate

a larger, perhaps an indefinite class of objects

. . • occupation

, •

avocation, calling, or pursuit, all of which may be declared and have been
so held privileges under our constitution. 11 78

"At the least, any occupa-

tion, business, employment, or the like affecting the public, aay be
classed and taxed as a privilege. 1179

"A privilege is whatever the Legis-

lature choose to declare to be a privilege and to tax as auch. 11 80 "The
Legislature has unlimited, and unrestricted power to tax privileges, and

78Phillips v. Lewis, 3 Shan. Cas. 230 (1877).
79 Railroad v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 43 S.W. 115, 53 L. R. A. 921 (1897).
8°Kurth v, State, 86 Tenn. 134, 5

s.w.

593 (1887).
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this power may be exercised in any manner or mode in ite diacretiou,"81
"In fact it has been said in two of our cases that, if thought proper, the
Legislature might make the business of farming a privilege. , • ,

The

term 'privilege' embraces any and all occupations that the Legislature aay

in its discretion choose to declare a privilege and tax as such, 1182
a

of

"The

power to tax privileges is not subject to any constitutional limitation
except that the tax levied must not be arbitrary, capricious or Wholly
unreasonab 1e. 1183 "Taxation of the privilege is upon the occc:~.-. t: '''· or
activity carried on amid the social, economic, and industrial environment,
1111 der protection of the state. 1184
(underlining added).
However, both by terms of Amendment No. 7 and prior judicial rulings,

and

l long
Jneral

'

iii
"ftnate

I·
IL-

e been

i•&is-

•
•
•
•II
and

(1897)

only the General Assembly may empower a municipality to tax privileges;
wthe Legislature alone can create a privilege and authorize its taxation,
mid , •• a municipal corporation cannot make any occupation a privilege,

aor impose a tax upon it, unless it has first been so declared by the
Leahlature." 85
We have seen in the foregoing cases that the General Assembly may
usu a "privilege," and may authorize municipalities to tax as a "priv-

tlaae," any "occupation, avocation, calling, pursuit, business, employ- t , activity, or the like affecting the public," even the "business of
8
1wilson v. State, 143 Tenn. 55, 224 S.W. 168 (1919) •
82
seven Springs Water Co. v. Kennedy, 156 Tenn. l, 299 s.w. 792,
5' A. L. R. 496 (1927),
13
Booten v. Carson, 186 Tenn. 282, 209 S.W.2d 273 (1948) •
14
(1t23). lank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Senter, 149 Tenn. 569, 260 S.W. 144
15
Trading Stamp Co. v. Memphis, 101 Tenn. 181, 47

s.w.

136 (1898).
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farming," and "whatever the Legislature choose to declare to be a privilege."

Under this broad construction of the taxing power may the General

Assembly authorize a municipality to impose a privilege tax on all pet1ons
working in a city, measured by thei.r income or earnings?

Of course the

question immediately arises, "Is this not a tax on incomes, prohibited by
the explicit terms of Amendment No. 7?"

This precise question was consid-

ered in a Kentucky case, in a manner so pertinent that it is quoted extensively below:
The Board of Aldermen of Louisville has imposed an
annual tax or license fee for the privilege of engaging
in any business, calling, profession or labor [actual .
wording of the ordinance: "occupation, trade, profession,
or other activity"] within the city, with certain exceptions. • . • The major attack • . • stems from the fact
that the measure of the tax is the earnings from the exercise of the privileges
being one per cent thereof.
The validity of the ordinance is principally questioned
upon the ground that it imposes an income tax in fact although it designates the tax as a license fee. . •• the
ordinance gathers within the sweep of its perimeter everybody who earns any money in any occupation, trade or profession or in the conduct of any business within the limits
of the city • . • •
A munic1pality's power to tax is only that which the
legislature has granted it.
Section 181 of the Constitution provides that the General Assembly may "delegate
the power to • . • cities ••• to impose and collect license fees on ••• franchises, trades, occupations and
professions." By an Act of 1948 • • • the General Assembly
provided: "Cities of all classes are authorized to levy
and collect any and all taxes provided for in Section 181
of the Constitution" • • • • "trades, occupations and professions" • • • is as far-reaching and as sweeping as
language could make it. It would be difficult to find
three words that cover wider fields of employment •
• • • that the right to earn a livelihood is an inalienable right guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution • • . is true may be conceded by all. However,
the Bill of Rights does not operate to relieve from taxation. . . .

• • • The principal storm center • • • is whether or
not this ordinance imposes an income tax, the taxpayers'
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argument being that the city has no authority to levy such
a tax. We need not pass upon the question of the existence
or absence of that power. Confusion in the case may arise
from placing so much emphasis on the measure of the tax as
to subordinate or lose sight of its true character. • ·• •
Since the levy is primarily for revenue, to speak with
technical accuracy, the tax imposed is an "occupation tax."
• • • This Louisville ordinance lays the tax upon the
privilege of working and conducting a business within the
city, and only measures the value of the privilege by the
smount of earnings or net profits. It is contended that
this is but a subterfuge [and] • • • it is but an income
tax. • • • We • • • hold the tax is not an income tax. •

86

The Louisville tax was austained as collectible from all employees
of the Federal government working in the city, including those at a Navel
Ordinance Plant owned by and under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Ontted States.

87

If the foregoing line of cases is followed, the Tennessee Supreme
Court could sustain a privilege tax on all businesses and persons work-

in& within a city, measured by net profits, income or earnings, on the
around& that such a tax would be a tax on the privilege and not on the
1DC09'e·

On this basis it would not come within the purview of the words

•co tu incomes" found in Amendment No. 7.
U.. lentucky case:

Compare the following with

"It [Chapter 31, Public Acts of 1923] is said

to illpo1e a direct tax on the incomes of corporations.
illpoeH an excise tax [elsewhere in the opinion:

• • the act

"an excise tax is an

t.Unct or privilege tax"] • • • the measure of the annual tax is a sum
. .l&&l to 3 per centum of the net earnings for the preceding fiscal year.

• • • the act is valid unless some other constitutional limitation bas

"1.ouisVille v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420, 214 S.W.2d 248 (1948).

17

Cooke v, LouisVille, 312 Ky. 1, 226 S.W.2d 328 (1950). Howard v.
••ioners, 344 U.S. 624, 97 L.Ed. 617, 73 S.Ct. 465 (1953) •

s
. ·: . .·
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been overstepped. " 88

"Section 30 [of Article 2 of the Constitution) .•

prohibits taxation upon the article manufactured of the produce of this
State. •

Section 30 does not inhibit the laying of a privilege:tax

upon the occupation of selling such articles."89 It may also be noted that
State privilege taxes on insurance companies are calculated as percentages
of their gross receipts.

90

Delegates in the Constitutional Convention expressed fears that dire
consequences would flow from this amendment, and others tried to give
reassurances.

Opinions were so divided thst perhaps a consensua of inten-

tion of this point was not established.

Mr. Pope thought that the clause, "the power of taxation of a municipality shall not be enlarged or increased except by general act," read
in relation to the Article it would amend, would remove any prohibition
on the Legislature "from passing an act levying an income tax on the people
in municipalities, or authorizing them to do it, either one ••

I don't

think the gentlemen meant to do it, but it is in there, and i t is clear." 91
Later, Mr. Pope observed, "They have undertaken to eliminate the objection by providing that the General Assembly shall not authorize any
municipality to tax income, estates or inheritances, or to impose any
other tax not authorized by Section 28 or 29 of Article II on the Constitution. "92 Mr. Pope then quoted this part of Section 28:

88

Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Senter, supra.

89Kurth v. State, supra.
90
TCA 56-408 et seq.
91Debates, p. 921.
92Debates, p. 1020.

•
69

No one species of property from which a tax iaay be
collected, shall be taxed higher than any other speciea
of property of the aame value, but the legislature •hall
have power to tax merchants, peddlers and privileges, in
1uch manner as they may from time to time direct.
And he followed with these comments:
Now, how has the Supreme Court of Tennessee construed
that; the Supreme Court of Tennessee has said on nllllleroua
occasions that the legislature has the power and the authority to levy any tax that it sees fit on privileges, and we
have a number of privilege taxes in Tennessee today, where
the measure of the tax ia the income of the individual tax
[.!!£].

• • . there· are a number of taxes in Tennessee exercised by the legislature as a privilege tax; one is called
an excise tax. What is the basis, what is the measure of·
the assessment upon which that excise tax is fixed; it is
the income of the party taxed.
that is exactly what the excise tax is, it ia
levied upon the grounds of being a privilege, and the measure of the tax, the methods on which the tax is calculated
can be the income of the party taxed under that excise law.
although the Supreme Court of Tennessee had said
the legislature could not levy the income tax, it did sustain this excise tax; it ~as three per cent upon the net
profits of the Memphis Natural Gas Company; • • . after the
case had gone to the Supreme Court of the United States, and
there affirmed, having been first decided by our Supreme Court.
Under this amendment, I say that the General Assembly
of this State could authorize any town in the State coming
under the home rule to enact, through its city council, an
excise tax based upon a privilege, they could declare anything they wanted to be a privilege, according to the Supreme Court of Tennessee; ••• anything, the Supreme Court
aaid, can be levied as a privilege tax because the Constitution does not prohibit it, and while it is not called an
income tax . • • because the measure of the tax is the income and of course the same applies to any other taxes, like
sales taxes, and so forth.93
Another delegate, Mr. Miles, agreed:
~ly

"Mr. Pope has talked consider-

about the taxation feature of this proposed Sims amendment; I shall

93

Debates, pp. 1020-1021.
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not undertake to repeat, except to aay that I believe that Kr. Pope is
right in every statement that he has made." 94

Two other delegate•, how-

ever, disagreed:
Kr. Ogle: Now, I am not an authority on taxation,
and I don't purport to be, but I don't think that the evil
he is trying to inject, or the fear that he is trying to
inject, into this Co111nittee relative to taxes exists; and
I don't think Kr. Pope deep down in his heart thinks it
exists himself. I have talked to a few other people about
the various evil taxes that could be imposed; these people
are authorities in the field of taxation, and they have
convinced me beyond a reasonable doubt that those evils
would not be present if the Sims proposal were adopted.
Kr. Ambrose: I listened with great interest to the
opponents of this measure yesterday, and they delineated
all of this new taxation that was going to be imposed upon
us. .
Now, they have been throwing the boogie-man in
here; that has no place in this record.95
To allay their fears, Kr. Killer said the following:
I would not support any plan of home rule which would
make it possible for the legislature to vest in our cities
any powers of taxation which it cannot vest in the cities
today under the present Constitution. Resolution No. 118
[which later became Amendment No. 7) leaves to the legislature the right to give the cities additional powers of
taxation from time to time only by general laws, whereas today additional powers of taxation can be given by special
acts as well as by general law. That is an additional safeguard which we have in this resolution, and in addition, we
have placed an absolute prohibition on certain kinds of taxes
ever being vested in municipalities. For example, any income tax, regardless of what the Supreme Court later holds
in regard to an income tax, that right could not be vested
in a city in view of this prohibition • • • ,96
The following exchange in the Convention might be construed as an
intention to place inspection fees beyond the reach of this prohibition:

94oebates, p. 1028.
95oebstes, pp. 1029, 1040.
96oebates, p. 1045.
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Mr. Smith: In the proviso against taxation, I ltnow
that you are and the delegates are familiar with inspection staffs which do not levy a tax, but collect the fee
for inspectors, the police power, sanitation, garbage
collection, and things of that sort; would that be construed as a tax, or is that an inspection fee that the
city would have the right under its police power to exact?
Mr. Sims: Well, of course, every city has a right
under its police power to provide for inspections; it cannot produce revenue through that means; but under this
provision, if the city elected not to come under home rule,
then it would continue under its charter just as it is,
and its charter would determine its power to levy local
taxes, subject to the general statutes of the State which
prohibit the imposition of certain types of taxes by cities.

'

Mr. Smith: ·Well, am I correct that an inspection fee
has been ruled not to be a tax?
Mr. Sims: An inspection fee for police purposes has
been ruled not to be a tax.97

***
Nothing herein shall be construed as
invalidating the provisions of any
municipal charter in existence at the
time of the adoption of this amendment.
Mr. Sims made this statement with respect to the foregoing:

"That

wa. intended to leave no doubt as to what the legal situation would be in
:rour municipalities if this amendment to the Constitution was adopted; it
will not invalidate any provision in your charter • • • that is now in
md.1tence.

That was requested by the mayors of the cities. u98

This

epparently is also a provision applicable to all municipalities, not just
ct.oee electing "home rule" status.

97Debates, p. 1014.

II

98x>ebates, p. 908.
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At first glance this would appear to be a simple, unequivocal provi•ion about which no question would arise.

However, a specific situation

has indicated that its effect may not always be clear.

A city with a pri-

vate act charter provision authori%ing annexation by ordinance wanted to
know whether this was superseded and invalidated by the 1955 annexation
law.

Does the operation of this clause sustain the private act, against

the preceding clause in Amendment No. 7:

"The General Assembly shall by

general law provide the exclusive methods •.•• by which municipal boundaries may be altered"?
In 1955 the General Assembly enacted a general annexation law (Chapter
113, Public Acts of 1955).

If the foregoing part of this amendment is con-

strued to make Chapter 113 truly "exclusive" as to how "municipal boundarie;
may be altered," in effect the charter provision for annexation by ordinanc.
would be invalidated by a part of Amendment No. 7 (Chapter 113 declared a
different legislative intention:

"except as specifically provided in this

Act, the powers conferred by this Act shall be in addition and supplemental to, and the limitations imposed by this Act shall not affect the
powers conferred by any other general, special or local law.")
Although a few such doubtful cases may arise, the general effect of
this provision seems to have been clearly set forth in Mr. Sims' explanation.

In general, municipal charters as they existed on November 3, 1953,

should not be disturbed by any provision in this amendment.

----------,\
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS
priThe experience with Amendment No. 6 seems to have been very ••tie-

to

factory.

One would naturally expect that local officials would •pprove

of the transfer of power effectuated by this amendment, and no complaint•
have been heard from them.

No effort was made to determine Whether Stata

officials have any objections; the appearance of occasional billa ai9ed
at curbing or dfrecting actions of counties/cities is perhaps an indication of a residue of the prior system that lodged all power in the State

(Chapter

legid•ture.
The accompanying table analyzes the acts of four sessions--two
~iennial

in 1955 and 1965 (79th and 84th General Aasemblies), and two

annual in 1973 and 1974 (the 88th General Assembly); totals are shown
for the latter two sessions, for comparison with the data of the biennial
.. s1ions.
t9ll

The number of acts for cities substantially dropped--81 in the

annual sessions combined, as compared with 211 in 1955.

County acts

1hcwd a decline in 1965, but in the two annual sessions combined were
laiahar (294) than the total of 271 in 1955.

A very high proportion of

tlM act• (85.6 to 97.6 per cent) called for approval by governing bodies,

llDd mo•t of them received favorable action (from 59 per cent for counties

1953,
ill 1955 to 94.3 per cent for cities in the •ame year); the approved nlllllher

,... proportionately higher for citiea in every •ession.
~tis

The experience

referendums was more divided--more county acts were disapproved in

1155, and more city acts were turned down in 1974 (all six were charter
:.:;"•t•.,h•nint•
for the City of Crossville).
--1-.:
.-

..-<

J .

1•
i

l
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ANALYSIS OF APPROVAL ACTIONS ON PRIVATE ACTS
1955, 1965, 1973 and 1974
Governmental Unit and
Type of Approval Action
County
Governing body
Approved
Disapproved
No action
Referendum
Approved
Disapproved
No action
Subtotals
City
Governing body
Approved
Disapproved
No action
Referendum
Approved
Disapproved
No action

79th
1955 _%_

160
55
17
10
19
10

85.6
59.0
20.3
6.3
14.4
3. 7
7 .0

84th
1965 _%_

9
2

94.4
74.9
19. 0
.5
5.6
4.6
1.0

146
37
l

3.7

88th (1973-74)
Total _%_ 1973- 1974

3
3

95.6
77.9 100
10. 9 10
6.8
10
4.4
2.4
2
1.0
2
1.0
100.0 124

229
32
20
7

271

100.0

195

100.0

294

199

97.6
94.3

72

66

.5

8

93.0
83. 7
9.3

1
6

2
3

Subtotals

211

Totals

482

2.8
2.4
1.0
1.4
100.0

2
4

4
2

86
281

7.0
4.7
2.3

100.0

88.9
81.5
2.5
4.9

129
22
10
5
3
l

170

25

41

3

2
1

11.1
1
6
2

1.2
7.4
2.5

1

81

100.0

29

52

153

222

375

6

2

To appraise the experience of the 13 cities that have adopted home
rule status, 30 of their officials 99 were contacted by telephone and asked
to respond to five questions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Why did your city elect home rule status?
Have you perceived any disadvantages of home rule status?
Has your city considered repeal of home rule status?
Do you recommend continuation of home rule status for your city?
Has your city experienced any problems with alleged general
acts that were private in effect (affecting only your city)?

99 seven mayors, fifteen city attorneys, four city managers (administrators), two members of governing bodies, and two city recorders; most of
them have (had) had fairly long tenure.

~. - ..:.,
. · . .:.

...

.-.
- --,

...

7.S
Some officials could not respond to the first
quenio.
tenure began some time after adoption of home rule

statue,

••••• dleir

'••i~:

M"u··

W

"allSVer this question, two-thirds (12)
quire local control of the charter drafting and
avoid dependence on the State legislature.
129
22
10
2

s

2

3
1

the

The

purpose was to gain protection

mented that this purpose would have
status because of the local veto
Six~-en

170

felt that there are no disadvantages of home

while 13 bad perceived one primary disadvantage:

greater

amendment by the referendum process.

41

critical in several cities with charter provisions limiting

2

1

of top officials.

.··;

Five respondents would recommend repeal of home rule status, but U ·_;
favored continuation.

Two cities have considered repeal, but in oul.7..,.

....-.... !.._4......

city has any formal action been taken; the Chattanooga City CommiaaiOll·, :...::
folloving a recommendation by a Charter Study Committee, bas called for: a
't'Ote in the November 1976 general election on whether to repeal h01De rule
statue.
The responses indicated that four cities have had some problems vitb
8dftrae "general acts of local application" which were private in effect,
1114 it was reported that several such acts bad been declared unconstitutt.... •l by the courts.
~

......

Three cities were not averse tc- accepting such

that were beneficial to them.
Although there are some negative aspects of home rule statua, as

· ~• 91;&.. 1a the foregoing summary, on balance the experience of Tennessee
"' ..~ .. sppean to be favorable.

"" ·•

l'he principal problem seems to be one

76

inherent in the democratic process:
charter changes.

persuading the voters to approve

